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ADVERSITY POLITICS: 
THE EFFECT OF STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY ON AMERICAN POLITCAL 
OUTCOMES 
 
 
Divided government has been studied at length in the political science literature, 
much of which has focused on the effect of this phenomenon on various legislative 
outcomes.  Despite this high level of attention, the literature has employed a narrow 
definition of divided government that equates the phenomenon with “divided party 
control.”  This dissertation demonstrates that divided government is comprised of several 
distinct components, of which party control is only part.  To determine whether 
government is truly divided, one must include measures of both party (party control and 
the strength of party majorities) and ideology (in terms of the ideological distance 
between the president and Congress).   
When previous studies of divided government are re-examined using these more 
appropriate measures of the components of divided government, it is clear that both party 
and ideology drive legislative outcomes.  This dissertation demonstrates that divided 
government is a much more complex political phenomenon.  Furthermore, this research 
suggests that the presidential-congressional relationship may be less adverse during 
periods of divided party control than periods of unified party control.  This underscores 
the need to include measures that capture the components of divided government in 
future studies on related topics. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The Era of Divided Government 
When the Republican Party increased its majority of seats in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate in the 2004 election, it ensured itself of another two years 
of unified government under President George W. Bush.  This unified party control has 
become rather uncommon in American national politics, especially over the last 40 years.  
There have been 29 congresses elected since 1949, of which 16 have faced a president 
from a different political party.  Thirteen of the twenty-three congresses since 1967 have 
encountered divided government1.  The prevalence of this political phenomenon has 
made it a topic of considerable concern, both in the Washington community and in 
academia.   
Immediately following the 2004 elections, the popular consensus was that the 
president had an increased ability to pursue his agenda in Washington.  It was also 
assumed that had the Democrats gained a majority in either the House of Representatives 
or the Senate, the president’s policy agenda would have been dead on arrival.  Yet, as the 
2006 congressional elections approach, it appears that the president received little benefit 
from unified government.  His main domestic program, social security reform, never 
came up for a vote in Congress.  Republicans also pleaded with the president to abandon 
                                                 
1 Senator James Jeffords’ (Vermont) changed his party affiliation from 
Republican to Independent in mid-2001.  The Jeffords defection wrestled control of the 
Senate from the Republican Party, giving the Democratic Party the slimmest of majorities 
(50 Democrats, 49 Republicans, 1 Independent).  The statistics on the prevalence of 
divided government treat the 107th Congress (2001-02) as being controlled by the 
Democratic Party, and thus a period of divided government. 
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any effort at tax reform.  Furthermore, immigration reform deeply divided the more 
moderate Senate Republicans from their more conservative brethren in the House of 
Representatives.  Hence, contrary to expectations, unified government did not lead to an 
active and successful political agenda.  Additionally, polls show broad dissatisfaction 
with both the President and Congress and, as of the spring of 2006, it appears that the 
Democratic Party has at least a reasonable prospect of regaining a majority of seats in the 
House of Representatives for the first time since 1994.  If the conventional wisdom about 
divided government is correct, such an outcome would stymie President Bush’s ability to 
work with members of Congress for the remainder of his second term. 
Although this conventional wisdom would lead one to believe that unified 
government provides a more advantageous political legislative environment for the 
president and Congress, this may not be the case, as the Bush example suggests.  Despite 
assumptions about the effect of this political phenomenon, the degree to which divided 
government presents a more adverse political environment than unified government is 
really an empirical question, one over which there has been considerable disagreement.  
This disagreement is driven both by how “divided government” is conceptualized and 
measured.   
Previous scholarship has used the terms “divided government” and “divided party 
control” interchangeably.  This dissertation contends, however, that these are distinct 
concepts.  “Divided government” is a function of both a partisan dimension and an 
ideological dimension.  As such, party control is only one component of divided/unified 
government.  In this dissertation, my objective is to reconcile some of the disparate 
findings within the scholarly literature as well as to explain apparent anomalies, such as 
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the failure of the Bush administration to govern with a Republican controlled Congress 
after the 2004 elections. 
The Focus on Divided Government 
Divided government and closely related subjects, such as the greater propensity of 
gridlock between the president and Congress, are much discussed and debated in the 
media and among private citizens.  Divided government also has been a widely debated 
topic in the political science literature.  Given the recurrence of divided government in 
recent decades, an increasing number of political scientists have examined questions 
related to this topic2.  While some have sought to explain the origins of divided 
government (Burden and Kimball 1998; 2002; Fiorina 1996), many others have studied 
the effect of divided government on various political outcomes (Binder 1999; 2003; 
Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Mayhew 1991).  In fact, there have been well over 
fifty studies (many of them which I discuss in Chapter 2) examining this topic over the 
past decade or so.  It is a central focus of attention among Congressional and presidential 
scholars (including those studying bureaucratic politics). Still, while it has received such 
vast attention recently, the literature has yet to come to a consensus about the effect of 
divided government on American political outcomes.  Some have argued that there is no 
significant difference between unified and divided government.  If these scholars are 
correct, then President Bush should have a similar ability to work with a Democratic 
Congress as he would a Republican legislature.  Others have disagreed, contending that 
                                                 
2 In this dissertation, I often refer to divided government, without also mentioning 
unified government each time.  These terms are complements of one another, so any 
discussion of divided government is also a discussion of unified government.  While 
these terms are not interchangeable, the statements made here could easily be reworded to 
address unified government instead of divided government. 
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divided government negatively affects political outcomes, posing a more adverse or 
deleterious political environment for both the president and for Congress.  If this group of 
researchers is correct, then a Democratic Congress elected in 2006 could severely hamper 
President Bush’s agenda in his final two years in office.  What explains these conflicting 
findings on the effects of divided government? 
This research contends that the seemingly contradictory findings on divided 
government are largely the result of our failure to understand what this political 
phenomenon really means.  While most scholars have treated divided government as a 
one-dimensional concept, I argue that previous scholars have failed to address both of the 
components of divided government: party and ideology.  Additionally, these components 
have varied greatly in the post-World War II period, making the findings of many 
previous studies dependent on the time period examined.  In sum, by better understanding 
the components of divided government and their effect on political outcomes, we may be 
able to reconcile the differences found in the divided government literature. 
 
Plan for the Dissertation 
As I note here, there has been considerable research on the subject of divided 
government, though much of it comes to contradictory conclusions about the effects.  In 
Chapter Two, I first provide a general discussion of what is meant by the term divided 
government.  Then, I examine how it has been discussed in the literature to date, before 
expanding on the traditional definition of divided government.  While most work has 
viewed divided government as a simple dichotomous political phenomenon, I describe 
various components of divided government, asserting that it is in fact much more 
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complex construct than is commonly thought.  I then examine each component of divided 
government, and why we should expect each to affect presidential-congressional 
relations. 
In Chapter Three, I address how the literature previously has operationalized 
divided government and then develops a new way to conceptualize and measure this 
phenomenon.  The vast majority of studies has treated divided government as 
unidimensional, and has employed a dummy variable to measure divided government, a 
measure that I argue is both theoretically and methodologically flawed.  I improve on this 
crude measure by measuring the components of divided government separately.  I also 
consider how these variables can be measured in aggregate-level models. 
Chapter Four examines the effects of divided government on three dependent 
variables that have been used in seminal studies of presidential-congressional relations.  
First, I examine presidential concurrence rates in Congress at the aggregate-level.  Next, I 
re-examine one of the central studies of divided government by reanalyzing Mayhew’s 
dependent variable, while considering the effect of the components of divided 
government on the number of major laws enacted in Congress.  Lastly, I study the 
components of divided government with respect to failed pieces of legislation.  Thus I 
examine both legislative success and legislative failure. 
Chapter 5 evaluates the components of divided government in individual-level 
analyses.  Rather than examining dependent variables that are aggregated to the two-year 
Congress, this chapter analyzes the effect of these components on the probability that the 
president will “win” on individual roll-call votes.  The goal of this chapter is to 
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demonstrate the applicability of the measures developed in this dissertation to dependent 
variables at both the aggregate and individual levels. 
Finally, in Chapters 6 I summarize the findings and discuss their relevance for the 
broader political science literature.  Additionally, I discuss avenues for future research.  
The final chapter also discusses other variables that may be examined using the measures 
offered here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Jeffrey Allen Fine 2006
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Chapter 2 
Understanding Divided Government 
 
Key questions: 
• What effect does divided government have on legislative outcomes? 
• What does divided government mean?  What are the components of divided 
government?  Which components of divided government have been shown to 
affect legislative outcomes? 
 
Previous Studies of Divided Government and Legislative Outcomes 
It is conventional wisdom that it should be harder for presidents to work with 
Congress in periods of divided government rather than periods of unified government.  
Pundits, politicians, and scholars have discussed divided government as a deleterious 
political environment for both Congress and the president.  Many treat this as an 
established fact, yet the political science literature has not reached a consensus on the 
issue.   
Over the last 15 years, more than fifty separate studies have examined the causes 
of divided government, as well as the effect of divided government on countless 
dependent variables that are pertinent to the presidential-congressional relationship.  This 
scholarship has generated seemingly conflicting results, with some finding support for the 
conventional perspective and others concluding that divided government does not impede 
executive-legislative cooperation.  Although the vast literature on divided government 
examines its effect on dozens of different dependent variables, this dissertation focuses 
on those variables that are most closely tied to presidential-congressional relations.  The 
primary concentration here is on legislative outcomes, including bill passage and failure.  
As we shall see in this chapter, in addition to legislative productivity, the literature has 
examined many presidential-congressional variables: “gridlock” in general, the judicial 
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and executive branch nomination/confirmation process, executive orders and other 
unilateral presidential actions, and congressional investigations of the executive branch. 
Legislative Success and Failure 
 The political science literature’s focus on divided government intensified in the 
wake of David Mayhew’s (1991) now seminal work on the subject, Divided We Govern.  
Mayhew questioned the conclusions of early political science research that argued that 
divided government provided a more deleterious political environment than unified 
government.   Mayhew examined the enactment of major pieces of legislation during 
periods of both unified and divided government (Cutler 1988; Sundquist 1988).  His 
results challenged the conventional wisdom, as he found no statistically significant 
difference between the number of major legislative enactments during unified and 
divided government periods.  Jones (1994) re-examined Mayhew’s work, ultimately 
echoing the assertion that divided government did not hamper legislative innovation more 
than unified government.  Given that these findings present such a stark contrast to 
conventional wisdom, the effects of divided government have been examined by many 
subsequent studies.  For the most part these studies have challenged Mayhew’s and 
Jones’ conclusions. 
 Some of the criticism of Mayhew’s work has revolved around his choice of 
dependent variables, the number of major pieces of legislation that passed during a two-
year period.  Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) offered an early revision of the Mayhew 
conclusion in their study on legislative failure (also see (Coleman 1999).  They contend 
that while legislative success and failure seem, on the surface, to be essentially the same 
phenomenon, this is not the case.  The number of legislative successes partly depends on 
 9  
the total number of possible items on the legislative agenda.  In other words, when many 
items are on the agenda, the number of successful bills may not change, but the number 
of failed bills may increase.  Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) demonstrate that there is 
a statistically significant difference between the number of bills that fail during periods of 
unified and divided government.   
 Other work on legislative failure focuses on the president’s veto power.  This veto 
power can be wielded formally by the president or presidents can simply threaten to use it 
to kill or shape legislation.  Groseclose and McCarty (2001) and Woolley (1991) have 
shown that presidents are more likely to veto legislation during periods of divided party 
control.  Presidents are also more likely to engage in veto bargaining when their party 
does not control both chambers of Congress (Cameron 2000).  Research has thus shown 
that failure at various stages of the legislative process is more likely during periods of 
divided government. 
Gridlock 
 The discrepancy between the studies of legislative success and legislative failure 
sparked a third wave of research on legislative productivity in Congress.  Rather than 
focusing only on the number of bills that passed or failed, scholars interested in the 
legislative process also considered the total number of possible items on the agenda.  In 
this vein, they examined the level of “gridlock” in Congress, and its relationship with 
divided government (Binder 1999; Binder 2003; Coleman 1999; Jones 1994).  “Gridlock” 
is defined as the amount of legislation passed, divided by the total number of possible 
pieces of legislation (Mayhew 1991; Binder 1999; Binder 2003, for example).  This 
calculation yields the percentage of issues that pass and fail during a given congressional 
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session.  As Binder (2003) notes, “framed this way, gridlock is best viewed as the share 
of salient issues on the nation’s agenda that is left in limbo at the close of a Congress” 
(2003: 20).  To measure the legislative agenda, Binder (2003) employs content analysis 
of news stories to determine the total number of possible pieces of legislation.3  Binder’s 
conclusion, that gridlock is more prevalent during divided than unified government, again 
challenges Mayhew’s conclusion while reaffirming the conventional wisdom about the 
deleterious effect of divided party control.4   
 Other scholars have offered rational-choice models of legislative gridlock, though 
not all of these reach conclusions similar to Binder.  Keith Krehbiel (1998) examines the 
relationship between the president and Congress through the prism of “pivotal” actors.  
Rather than arguing that every member of Congress is an important player, Krehbiel 
asserts that the key actors are the median member of Congress, the 60th member 
necessary to invoke cloture (the “filibuster pivot”), and the 67th member necessary to 
overturn a presidential veto (the “veto pivot”).  The preferences of these pivotal players 
in the system determine the “gridlock interval,” which affects how much legislation gets 
enacted in Congress (as well as the content of that legislation).  According to Krehbiel, it 
is this gridlock interval, rather than divided government, that decreases the flow of 
legislation through the chamber and increases the amount of policy stagnation.  However, 
according to Krehbiel gridlock is also possible when the presidency and Congress are 
                                                 
3 Binder (2003) creates five gridlock measures, with each of these representing a different 
level of legislative salience.  After generating the total number of possible items for 
legislative enactment, Binder determines the amount of gridlock present in a given 
congressional session.   
4 Jones (2001) also examines the antecedents of legislative gridlock.  Though his measure 
of items on the legislative agenda differs from the Binder measure (he uses 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, rather than the New York Times), the substantive 
conclusions of his piece are consistent with those of Binder (1999; 2003). 
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held by the same party.  This model is similar to one offered by Brady and Volden 
(2006), as both models originated from collaborative work by all three of these authors 
(Brady, Volden, and Krehbiel 1994).  In their book, Brady and Volden underscore the 
importance of the median member, as well as the other players that Krehbiel (1998) 
describes.  In both of these works, however, the authors discuss how gridlock is possible 
under both unified and divided party control.  Brady and Volden (2006) assert that the 
current Congress is an example of gridlock under unified government: 
When this gridlock occurs under unified party control of government, we call it 
unified gridlock.  Unified gridlock resulted under the 103rd Congress during the 
first two years of the Clinton administration.  Unified gridlock explains the limits 
on major policy change in the 109th Congress today. 
 
The prevalence of gridlock under both divided and unified party control again 
demonstrates some conflict in the literature, as the conclusions of these rational choice 
theories are not consistent with Binder’s findings. 
More recent work has revised the Krehbiel model, allowing for variation in the 
effects of party and preferences of members (Chiou and Rothenberg 2003; Epstein, 
Kristensen, and O'Halloran Forthcoming).  Epstein, Kristensen, and O’Halloran 
(Forthcoming) challenge the Krehbiel conclusion that the width of the gridlock interval 
significantly affects legislation, as opposed to divided government.  These scholars, 
employing a more appropriate measure of the gridlock interval (Krehbiel used shifts in 
party seats, while they use a measure of ideology), find that it does not have a significant 
effect, while divided government does significantly promote legislative stalemate.  Chiou 
and Rothenberg (2003) find mixed evidence regarding the effect of divided government 
on gridlock.  They examine the topic using various gridlock measures as the dependent 
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variable - the Binder (2003) measures and Coleman (1999) measure, for example.  While 
divided government does significantly affect gridlock in some models, this finding is not 
universal.   
A third set of studies re-examining Mayhew’s conclusion utilize measures of 
legislative “productivity.”  These studies improve on the Mayhew data, as they typically 
have more nuanced classifications of “significant” legislation.  Using these improved 
classifications, scholars have reached conclusions that also rival those of the original 
Mayhew study.  Kelly (1993) finds that significant legislation is more likely during 
unified party control.  Howell, Adler, Cameron and Reimann (2000) create four distinct 
categories of legislative significance, with different findings for each classification.  
While, like Kelly (1993), they find that the passage of the most important legislation is 
less likely during periods of divided government, Howell et al. (2000) find that the some 
legislation is actually more likely during divided government5.  Again, the choice of 
dependent variable and the data choices made by specific researchers have important 
implications for examining the relationship between divided government and the 
likelihood of legislative passage/failure. 
 Yet, criticism of Mayhew’s conclusion is not limited merely to the choice of 
dependent variable.  It also involves the methods Mayhew employed.  Howell et al. 
(2000) argue that the Mayhew data suffer from time-serial problems.  Specifically, these 
authors demonstrate that the data utilized by Mayhew are non-stationary, biasing the 
results of his models.   When the non-stationary nature of the data is taken into account, 
                                                 
5 Howell, Adler, Cameron and Reimann (2000) find that the legislation deemed 
the least important actually passes at a higher rate during divided government than during 
unified government.  This seems to indicate that gridlock is likely on the legislation that 
both parties care about, and legislation that receives the most attention. 
 13  
divided government does hamper legislative success in Congress.  Meanwhile, Epstein, et 
al (Forthcoming) argue that Mayhew’s main independent variable, policy activism, is 
atheoretical.  In fact, its inclusion in the model may account for the non-significant 
finding with regard to the effects of divided government. 
In sum, while early scholars challenged the conventional wisdom by arguing that 
there was no significant difference between unified and divided party control, this 
conclusion has been the subject of numerous subsequent studies, many of which refute 
Mayhew’s basic findings. 
Presidential Success Rates 
 Measuring the amount of legislative success and failure, or legislative 
productivity and gridlock, is obviously important for understanding legislative behavior.  
Some scholars, however, have postulated that these variables do not capture accurately 
the presidential-congressional dynamic.  Bond and Fleisher (1990), for example, discuss 
at length different measures of “presidential success” in Congress.  The measure they 
employ, “individual presidential support scores,” allows us to understand how often 
Congress delivers a product that the president desires.  These support scores, also referred 
to as “presidential success scores,” first determine the bills on which the president has a 
clearly stated position.  The support scores are simply the percentage of these bills in 
which a majority of the chamber votes with the presidential position.  In other words, 
how often does Congress vote with the president? 
 Bond and Fleisher (1990) examine, among other things, the effect of divided 
government on these presidential support scores.  They largely discuss this question in 
terms of “minority” and “majority” presidents, classifying chief executives by whether 
 14  
his party held a majority or minority of seats in Congress.   They conclude, “while unified 
party control is no guarantee of success on any given vote, the probability of defeat 
increases significantly when the branches are controlled by different parties” (230).  This 
affirms the findings of others (Cutler 1988; Sundquist 1988) who argue that divided 
government does depress the success rate for certain legislation in Congress. 
Other Presidential-Congressional Variables 
In addition to the amount of legislation passed in Congress, scholars have also 
examined how divided government affects the content of legislation.  Epstein and 
O’Halloran (1996; 1999) and Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler (2001) observed that while the 
number of legislative enactments does not vary between times of unified and divided 
government, the legislative content does.  Congress delegates greater levels of discretion 
to the bureaucracy when a president of the same party inhabits the White House and less 
discretion during periods of divided government.  Krutz (2001a; 2001b) also found that 
omnibus legislation is more prevalent when the president and the majority of Congress 
are controlled by different parties.   
The success and failure of legislation is not the only dependent variable examined 
in presidential-congressional studies.   Despite the great deal of attention paid to 
legislation, an increasing amount of attention has been paid to other presidential-
congressional variables.  Mayhew’s Divided We Govern (1991) not only examined 
legislative productivity, it also examined the proclivity of Congress to investigate the 
behavior of members of the executive branch.  Mayhew’s conclusion with respect to 
these investigations is consistent with his conclusions about legislative enactments: the 
effects of divided and unified government are not significantly different from one 
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another.  Although this dependent variable has not been revisited with the same vigor as 
Mayhew’s legislative chapters, recent congressional investigations seem to present new 
evidence that rival this conclusion.  The congressional investigations of the Clinton 
administration, many of which occurred during periods of divided government (and 
which obviously took place after the publication of the Mayhew study) suggest that 
executive branch investigations may indeed be more likely to occur during divided 
government – perhaps more so than during unified government.  The paucity of 
congressional investigations during the present Bush administration suggests the same 
conclusion. 
 An increasing number of studies have considered the effect of divided 
government on presidential nominations.  When different parties control the presidency 
and Congress, presidential nominations may be less likely to be confirmed by the Senate.  
This hypothesis has been tested in recent studies, which have found that divided 
government affects both the success rate of presidential nominees and the length of the 
confirmation process.  These studies of presidential nominations include nominations to 
fill both executive branch positions and judicial vacancies.  Much like the literature on 
legislative success and failure, this literature has presented conflicting accounts.  Some 
scholars have demonstrated that divided government adversely affects the confirmation 
process (Binder and Maltzman 2002; McCarty and Razaghian 1999; Shipan and Shannon 
2003).  According to these scholars, divided government leads to delay in the 
confirmation process (Binder and Maltzman 2002; Shipan and Shannon 2003), though if 
the nominations are made early in a presidential term the confirmation is often inevitable.  
Still, some argue that presidential nominees are much more likely to fail during periods 
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of divided government (McCarty and Razaghian 1999), while others contend that there is 
no significant difference between the success rate of presidential nominees during unified 
and divided party control (Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998).  These findings apply both to 
judicial and executive branch nominees, underscoring the importance of revisiting the 
effect of divided government on a variety of outcomes. 
Unilateral Presidential Actions 
Recent work on presidential-congressional relations has examined instances when 
the president behaves independently of Congress to achieve some political goal.  
Although this behavior is outside the traditional bounds of presidential-congressional 
relations, I examine these unilateral presidential actions because this recent work posits 
that the president intentionally avoids working with the legislature as a means of 
sidestepping political obstacles. 
 Kenneth Mayer has conducted extensive research on presidential use of executive 
orders.  Mayer (2001; 1999) demonstrates a bizarre finding regarding the relationship 
between executive orders and divided government.  Theoretically, we should expect 
presidents to issue more executive orders during periods of divided government, as 
presidents seeking change avoid a potentially adversarial Congress.  However, Mayer 
finds the opposite to be true: Presidents issue more executive orders during periods of 
unified government.  This perplexing conclusion has not been fully explained in the 
literature. 
 Other related work examines various unilateral actions that presidents engage in 
to circumvent a Congress controlled by an opposing party.  Howell (2003) expands 
rational choice models of executive-legislative relations by including instances where the 
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president takes action without consulting Congress.  Howell finds that these unilateral 
tactics are more common during divided party control, indicating that there is evidence 
that presidents do, in fact, act strategically (beyond the use of executive orders) to 
achieve political goals without the aid of members of Congress.  As with several other 
dependent variables, the findings in the unilateral actions literature are somewhat 
contradictory, only heightening the need for further study of divided government’s 
effects. 
Across the span of these different dependent variables, and even within some, 
there is disagreement over the effects of divided government.  Some of these findings 
support the conventional wisdom that states presidents and Congress should be less likely 
to work well together when they are controlled by different political parties.  Other work, 
however, brings into question whether divided government actually poses a negative 
political environment at all.  Before we can further examine whether divided government 
actually poses a more adverse political environment than does unified government, it is 
necessary to evaluate what divided government actually means.  In so doing, we may be 
able to reconcile some of the differences that emerge in the scholarly literature. 
 
Defining Divided Government 
The term “divided government” has, to date, been defined in a rather 
straightforward manner: a period when the party that controls the presidency does not 
control both chambers of Congress.  This definition emphasizes the most basic 
component of the divided government phenomenon: party control of political institutions.  
This traditional definition contradicts the justification for examining divided government 
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with respect to various dependent variables; namely that divided government represents a 
more adverse relationship between the president and Congress.  Control of Congress by 
an opposition party itself may not necessarily pose a threat to the president and his 
agenda.  Instead, there are other components than party control that matter when 
considering presidential-congressional relations.  Rather than equating “divided 
government” with “divided party control,” I contend that these are distinct concepts.  
Divided government contains two theoretically distinct components, party control and 
ideology.6 
Party Component 
Party control is the obvious component of divided government, as these terms 
have been used interchangeably in the literature.  In addition to mere control of 
legislative chambers, the degree to which the president’s party controls these chambers is 
also important.  When the president’s party does not control a majority of seats in both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate, divided party control exists.  This majority 
may hold only one extra seat or it may outnumber the opposition by a wide margin.  
However, very few individuals would argue that the size of a party’s majority (i.e. the 
                                                 
6 One possible component of divided government that will not be included here is 
congressional rules and procedures (See Evans 1999 for a thorough review of this 
literature).  Although there are reasons to expect that rules and procedures of Congress 
affect legislative outcomes, it is difficult to measure these effects.  As Evans (1999) 
notes, data necessary to examine “the linkage between rules and outcomes…are seldom 
available” (605-06).  Further, the exclusion of rules in models of legislative outcomes 
will not bias the results of this research, as there is no theoretical reason to expect these 
rules to be related to divided government.  It is possible, even probable, that the use of 
certain procedures is more common during divided government.  However, the 
examination of these as dependent variables is beyond the scope of this research.  Some 
factors typically grouped with rules and procedures - for example, the filibuster, decisions 
by committee and party leadership, and committee jurisdictions (Evans 1999)- will be 
discussed in relation to other components of divided government discussed above. 
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gap between the number of seats held by the majority party and the minority party) is 
irrelevant.  Unified and divided party control is determined by seat allocations (along 
with the party of the president), and in this regard the distribution of seats determines the 
degree of party control 
  In addition to the size of the partisan majority (minority), there are other 
dimensions of the “party” component of divided government: party control of legislative 
committees and chamber leadership positions.  When a political party controls a majority 
of seats in the House of Representatives and/or the Senate, that party also controls the 
chairmanship of every committee in that chamber.  During periods of unified party 
control, the chairman of every congressional committee is from the same party as the 
president.  During divided party control, however, the committee chairmen (in at least 
one chamber) are held by a party other than that of the president.  Similarly, the 
allocation of seats on congressional committees is determined by the partisan 
composition of the entire chamber.  The control of these committee leaders and seats are 
a function of party control of Congress, and is thus a component of the larger 
phenomenon of “divided government.”   
The chamber leadership positions are also determined by partisan control.  When 
the Republican Party retained its control of both the House and the Senate following the 
2004 elections, they also maintained control of the congressional leadership positions.  
Specifically, Republicans hold all the positions of Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Majority Leader, and Majority Whips.  In the Senate, the Majority 
Leaders and Whips are Republicans by virtue of their majority party status, while the 
Democratic Party selects the Minority Leader and Whips in both chambers.  These 
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chamber leadership positions are also a component of divided government, as they are a 
direct function of partisan control of each legislative chamber.  During unified party 
control, the president’s party holds the chamber leadership positions, while the opposition 
party controls these positions during periods of divided party control.  The chamber 
leadership is thus another component of “divided government.” 
Ideological Component 
Divided government may also bring with it an increased amount of ideological 
distance between the president and key members of Congress.  As party control of a 
chamber differs from the party of the president, many potentially important congressmen 
and senators will be members of the opposition party.  As a result, it is possible that the 
members from the opposition party will have policy preferences that are very different 
from those of the president.  However, this may not always be the case.  For example, 
Southern Democrats in the 1960s were far more conservative than the Democratic 
presidents of the same time (Kennedy and Johnson).  This is true of both the rank-and-file 
members of Congress and also those in leadership positions.  Just as the control of 
committee chairs and chamber leaders are variants of the party control of divided 
government, so too are the ideologies of these members variants of the ideological 
component.  Those in leadership positions may have preferences similar to the average 
member from their party, or they may be have preferences outside the mainstream.  The 
ideology of these members is meaningful, as it represents the degree to which 
(dis)agreement exists between the president and members of the legislature. 
As most studies have considered divided government in terms of party control, 
the relationship between ideology and divided government is an empirical question that 
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requires further attention.  Despite the view that divided government poses a more 
“adverse” political environment, this conventional wisdom has not been tested fully, that 
is, considering these distinct aspects of divided government.  Only some of the 
components of divided government have been included in previous studies, again with 
mixed results.   
 
Merging Two Literatures 
As discussed above, there is a great deal of literature examining the effects of 
divided government on various presidential-congressional outcomes.  However, given 
that these previous studies have used “divided party control” to mean “divided 
government,” this research has not fully explored both components of the larger 
phenomenon of divided government. 
The scholarly literature has not ignored the components of divided government 
altogether.  On the contrary, these factors have been examined at great length, with 
various studies examining the effect of one of these components on a particular 
dependent variable.  In the past, the literature examining party effects and ideology 
effects have treated these as competing forces.  I contend that both of these are part of the 
larger “divided government” phenomenon, and that one or both of these may drive any 
particular legislative outcome.  In other words, party effects and ideology effects are not 
mutually exclusive.  By conceptualizing divided government only in terms of party 
control, and by viewing party and ideology as completely distinct, the literature 
examining the effects of these components of divided government provides contradictory 
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results.  The phenomenon of divided government can be understood better by merging 
the literatures on party effects and ideological effects. 
Party 
As party control has been used to define divided government, the existing 
literature on divided government has really been an extensive review of this one narrow 
component of the larger divided government phenomenon.  As discussed above, there is 
mixed evidence on the effect of party control.  However, the literature on party effects are 
not confined to the “divided government” literature.  The party component of divided 
government has also received a great deal of treatment in other areas of the political 
science literature.   
Much has been written on the subject of political parties in the American system, 
with many studies examining legislative outcomes.  While some scholars find evidence to 
support the claim that parties affect legislative behavior, this finding is not universal.  
Some scholars assert that political parties drive roll-call voting in Congress.  This 
literature argues that it is partisanship of members of Congress, rather than the policy 
preferences of these members, that affects voting behavior (Aldrich and Rohde 1998; 
Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Hager and Talbert 2000; Snyder and 
Groseclose 2000; Strattman 2000).  Not only are bills affected by partisanship, but so are 
presidential nominations.   Additionally, party affiliation may drive coalition formation in 
Congress, as legislators will seek to bargain with other members of their own party as 
they seek a majority of support for a particular bill.  (Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 
1999).   
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Other work has yielded contradictory results about the effects of party control.  
The literature discussing the effects of divided government on legislative outcomes (or 
lack thereof) is essentially testing how party control shapes presidential-congressional 
relations.  Research has indicated that party does not matter in terms of legislative 
outcomes, as no significant relationship exists (Jones 1994; Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 
1998; Mayhew 1991).   
Much of the literature that evaluates models of party influence on presidential-
congressional outcomes contrasts these hypothesized effects with those of competing 
variables.  This literature argues that the apparent effect of political parties is actually the 
result of policy preferences of members.  This literature concludes that it is the ideology 
of congressmen that shapes legislative outcomes in terms of roll-call voting (Brady and 
Volden 2006; Chiou and Rothenberg 2003; Epstein, Kristensen, and O'Halloran 
Forthcoming; Krehbiel 1993; Krehbiel 1995; Krehbiel 1998; Krehbiel 1999; McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2001), the success of presidential nominees (Binder and Maltzman 
2002; Shipan and Shannon 2003), and in terms of coalition formation (Krehbiel 1995; 
Krehbiel 1999).  
As noted above, political parties are at the heart of the divided government 
literature, as most studies define divided government in terms of party control.  However, 
the effect of political parties can extend beyond simply controlling legislative chambers 
and/or the presidency, particularly in terms of the strength of partisan control of the 
legislature.  As such, I seek to separate party control (simply controlling a majority) from 
the effect of increasingly large (small) partisan majorities (deficits).  This distinction is 
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grounded in the scholarly literature, and there is still disagreement over whether the 
strength of party seat allocations actually matters. 
Party control and seat allocations are intimately related, as the president’s party 
obviously holds more seats in the legislature during periods of unified party control than 
it does during divided party control.  In this regard, Epstein, Kristensen, and O’Halloran 
(Forthcoming) note that “seat share is a more sensitive indicator of divided government.”  
However, some scholars argue that the number (or percentage) of seats held by the 
president’s party significantly affects presidential-congressional outcomes. 
Light (1999) argues that, "party seats remain the gold standard for presidential agenda 
setting.  Short-term gains in presidential approval can make the influence of those seats more 
liquid perhaps, but cannot convert a Republican seat into a Democratic seat unless than 
approval creates a coattail in the next election."  Similarly, Rudalevige (2002) asserts that, 
"majority party presidents, quite simply, do better on the floor of Congress than do minority 
party presidents; and the larger the majority, the better the president does."  The conclusion is 
that the size of a president’s seat advantage (or deficit) is an important component of the larger 
phenomenon of divided government.   
Bond and Fleisher (1990), in their work on presidential-congressional relations, 
demonstrate the importance of seat allocations to presidential success in Congress.  
However, rather than the raw number/percentage of seats held by the president’s party, 
Bond and Fleisher examine the ideology of these members.  They create four 
classifications of members: the president’s base seats, cross-pressured members of the 
president’s party, cross-pressured members of the opposition party, and the opposition 
party’s base seats.  The president can count on his base to consistently support his 
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agenda, and thus larger numbers of base members is advantageous.  Likewise, a smaller 
number of base seats for the opposition party leads to higher levels of presidential 
success.  The cross-pressured members are those whose ideology is closer to that of the 
median member of the other political party, often simply classified as moderate partisans.  
These majorities (presidential base seats, and cross-pressured members of the president’s 
party) are typically larger during divided party control, and can significantly affect 
presidential-congressional relations (Bond and Fleisher 1990).  
While these scholars argue that the number (or percentage) of seats held by the 
president’s party is important for legislative success, Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997) do not 
believe that every additional seat matters.  They argue that “the most important increment to a 
party’s coalition in Congress is the one that provides it the majority to organize a chamber. 
Each additional vote after 50% plus one does not add an equal increment to the power of the 
majority party.”   Given this disagreement in the literature, it is important to examine whether 
partisan seat allocations provide additional information about legislative outcomes, once 
controlling for the effect of party control of a simple majority. 
To better understand the relationship between divided government and legislative 
outcomes, we need to determine the role that party plays in determining political 
outcomes when controlling for the ideological component of the phenomenon. 
Ideology 
A second component of divided government is ideological distance between the 
president and key members in Congress.  Many scholars and pundits have assumed that 
the president and Congress will typically share policy preferences during periods of 
unified party control and have divergent preferences when divided party control exists.  
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However, party control and ideological (dis)agreement are distinct, and do not 
necessarily accompany one another.  Given that these are separate components of the 
larger phenomenon of divided government, we can examine the relative effect of party 
and ideology, to see whether one component, both components, or neither component 
drives legislative outcomes.  Questions such as these about the effect of party and 
ideology are not new to the literature on legislative outcomes.  Rather, a great deal of 
literature has examined the effect of policy preferences, with many concluding that 
ideology plays a significant role in shaping legislative outcomes. 
 Recently, the effects of ideology on legislative outcomes have been explored in 
the literature on “gridlock.”  These studies, discussed above, examine the role of 
preferences (both of presidents and key members of Congress) on various legislative 
outcomes.  This gridlock literature has remained largely separate from the divided 
government literature, even though each addresses a separate component of the larger 
divided government phenomenon.  This dissertation seeks to reconcile these two 
literatures, as they both help justify the expanded definition of divided government. 
The gridlock literature, however, is not the only work on the effects of ideology.  
As discussed in the previous section, much of this literature pits party against ideology, 
attempting to determine which of these factors drives various congressional outcomes.  
Some scholars assert that party drives legislative behavior, regardless of the preferences 
of the members of these political parties (Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999; Cox 
and Poole 2002; Hager and Talbert 2000; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; Strattman 2000).  
Other scholars have taken exception to this claim, arguing that it is ideology that 
determines how members will vote, how coalitions will form, how long the confirmation 
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process will take, as well as many other outcomes (Binder and Maltzman 2002; Bond and 
Fleisher 1990; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Kingdon 1981; Krehbiel 1993; Krehbiel 2000; 
Poole and Rosenthal 1997).  The disagreement between these two camps persists, as the 
literature has yet to reach consensus about the relative impact of party and ideology.   
 In addition to the work that has studied ideology and congressional behavior, 
some recent research has incorporated measures of ideological distance between key 
actors in the system.  While Krehbiel’s (1998) preference-based rational choice model 
discusses the relative position of “pivotal” players and the president, the model does not 
account for the specific ideology scores of these actors.  More recent work (Epstein, 
Kristensen, and O'Halloran Forthcoming) has revised the Krehbiel model, determining 
the ideological distance between the pivotal member that Krehbiel (1998) and Brady and 
Volden (2006) posit.  Epstein, et al. (Forthcoming) conclude that a larger gridlock 
interval (i.e. a larger ideological distance between key actors in the presidential-
congressional relationship) does not significantly affect the level of policy stalemate in 
Congress, challenging the conclusions of Krehbiel (1998) and Brady and Volden (2006).  
Other scholars have incorporated ideological distance measures to study the confirmation 
process of judicial nominees.  Shipan and Shannon (2003) find that the ideological 
distance between the president and the Senate determines both the success rate of 
nominees and the duration of these confirmation proceedings.  The further apart the 
president and Senate are ideologically, the more likely the president’s nominees will be 
stonewalled by the Senate.  When, on the other hand, the president and Senate share 
similar preferences, nominees are confirmed with much greater speed and success.  These 
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models are important, as they show that the relative ideology of different actors in the 
political system may shape presidential-congressional outcomes. 
More recent literature on roll-call voting, gridlock, and legislative productivity 
has examined the effect of ideology in a slightly different light by focusing on the 
polarization of political parties (Aldrich and Battista 2000; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; 
Binder 1999; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Brady and Volden 2006; Jones, True, and 
Baumgartner 1997; Jones 2001; McCarty and Razaghian 1999).  Rather than looking at 
the ideological distance between key actors, this literature considers the ideological 
distance between the Democratic and Republican members of Congress.  According to 
these scholars, it is not the number of partisans that determine political outcomes, but 
rather the ideology of these members.  When parties are more moderate, and thus 
ideologically proximate, we should expect more bipartisanship and compromise.  This 
should promote legislative productivity.  However, when political parties are 
ideologically divergent, finding common ground is exceedingly difficult.  Under these 
conditions, stalemate is much more likely.  As with the other components of divided 
government, there is variation in how well these hypotheses hold up empirically.  Party 
polarization appears to lead to policy gridlock (Binder 1999; Bond and Fleisher 2000; 
Jones 2001), as well as lengthening the confirmation process for presidential nominees 
(McCarty and Razaghian 1999).  Given these findings, it would seem logical that 
polarization would also lead to incrementalism, as divergent parties should keep sharp 
policy changes in check.  Jones, True, and Baumgartner (1997), however, do not find this 
to be the case.  Again, the findings in the literature are contradictory. 
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 Much of the literature does not separate the effect of congressional leadership on 
the presidential-congressional relations from those of party described above.  Given that 
the majority party controls the chamber leadership positions, the preferences of these 
leaders are entirely determined by party control.  There are also reasons to expect these 
leaders to affect presidential-congressional outcomes (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Chiou 
and Rothenberg 2003; Jackson 1974; Kingdon 1981; Sinclair 1995).  
The chamber leadership (such as the Speaker of the House, House and Senate 
Majority/Minority Leaders, House and Senate Majority and Minority Whips) is able to 
shape the behavior of their members throughout the legislative process (Bond and 
Fleisher 1990; Chiou and Rothenberg 2003; Jackson 1974; Kingdon 1981; Sinclair 1995).  
These leaders can relay preferences of the administration to members in the legislature, 
affect the referral of legislation to particular committees, organize members to filibuster 
or invoke cloture, cue voting behavior among partisans on the floor, and provide benefits 
(punishments) for members who support  (do not support) the party line (Bond and 
Fleisher 1990; Chiou and Rothenberg 2003; Jackson 1974; Kingdon 1981; Sinclair 1995).  
While it is clear that the president’s party holds the majority leadership positions during 
unified party control and the opposition party does so during divided party control, the 
ideology of these leaders vary widely (as will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 3).  
Presumably the preferences of the leaders are closer to those of the president during 
unified party control and farther away during divided party control.  It is unclear whether 
the preferences of these leaders, relative to the rank-and-file and president, also affect 
legislative outcomes. However, this is another empirical question that needs to be tested.   
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 In addition to these chamber leadership positions, those in control of 
congressional committees are also important.  The president’s party controls the 
leadership of every congressional committee (and additionally control a majority of the 
seats on every committee) during unified party control, while the opposition party 
controls these positions in at least one legislative chamber during divided party control.  
Despite party playing a role in determining the pool from which these leaders are 
selected, it is possible to have a wide range of preferences represented by these chairmen.   
 Bond and Fleisher (1990) describe the power that committee chairman can have 
on presidential-congressional outcomes, stating that “decisions of committee leaders to 
support or oppose the president’s preferences on issues that come through their 
committees are nonetheless a major determinant of success” (1990).  Committee 
chairmen help determine to which subcommittee legislation will be referred, whether 
hearings will be held on particular issues, and whether legislation is referred from the 
committee back to the floor of the chamber (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Sinclair 1983; 
Sinclair 1995; Smith and Deering 1984; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995).  Given 
the importance of committee chairmen in the legislative process, it is especially important 
to include these key actors when examining presidential-congressional dependent 
variables.  These congressional leaders are included within the “ideology component” as 
their preferences vary widely and may explain differences in behavior across chairmen 
from the same political party.  
Although these components have been included in previous research to some 
extent, they generally are included separately rather than collected in the same research.  
Yet all of these components together determine the amount of agreement between the 
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president and Congress.  In other words, it is the cumulative effect of these various 
components that determines just how “divided” or “unified” government really is.  
 
Conclusions 
As discussed above, a great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the topic of 
divided government, examining whether this political phenomenon hampers presidential-
congressional relations.  Divided government seems to affect some areas of presidential-
congressional relations adversely but not others.  Despite copious discussion, the 
literature has not come to a consensus about the effects of divided government, leaving us 
unsure whether divided government is actually more deleterious for presidents than 
unified government.   
Although this phenomenon has received so much attention in the literature, divided 
government has been defined narrowly in terms of party control of political institutions.  
While may have assumed that divided party control is accompanied by a more adverse 
relationship between the president and Congress, this has not been established 
empirically.  This research contends that party and preferences represent distinct 
components of the larger phenomenon of divided government.  Furthermore, despite the 
wealth of research on divided government, no empirical work to date has examined 
which component(s) of divided government are most likely to affect various political 
outcomes.  Perhaps some components of divided government affect the success/failure of 
legislation, but not judicial nominations.  Perhaps other components of divided 
government affect the proclivity of presidents to veto legislation, or of committees to kill 
legislation.  Without developing models that can test the relative effects of different 
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components of divided government, we will not truly understand how divided 
government affects presidential-congressional relations. 
 Is it possible then that these seemingly contradictory findings on the effects of 
divided government are the product of the narrow definition and measures most 
commonly used to operationlize “divided government”?  As a step towards addressing 
this question, the next chapter offers measures of the components of divided government 
that are consistent with the broader definition offered above.  By creating distinct 
variables to capture these different components, we can test their relative effect on 
legislative outcomes. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Measuring Adversity between Congress and the President 
 
Key questions: 
• How is divided government traditionally measured? 
• What are the assumptions and limitations of the divided government dummy 
variable? 
• How can we operationalize the components of divided government? 
 
Why Measurement Matters 
 As Chapter Two demonstrates, the literature examining the effects of divided 
government is divided, with seemingly contradictory findings and theories that do not 
fully explain a wide range of political outcomes.  While some scholars have found no 
significant difference between periods of unified and divided government, others have 
found that the latter hinders presidential-congressional relations and legislative outcomes.  
I argue that these contradictory findings may be the result, at least in part, of the measures 
used to operationalize the phenomenon.  More specifically, the failure of previous 
scholars to incorporate measures that allow for the relative test of the components of 
divided government may account for this divided literature. 
 Both the ideological and partisan components of divided government discussed in 
the previous chapter may have an effect on legislative outcomes.  However, the literature 
has to date equated “divided government” with “divided party control.”  Not only are 
there reasons to believe that these components may shape presidential-congressional 
relations, but there are also reasons to expect variation in these components over time.  
Given both the seemingly contradictory findings and the dynamics of the components of 
divided government, there is a need in the literature for measures that allow scholars to 
distinguish “party control” for the broader concept of “divided government.”  In this 
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chapter, I discuss the various measures that will be used to test the impact of each 
component on various legislative outcomes.  By testing the relative effect of each of these 
components on commonly examined dependent variables, I hope to reconcile the 
seemingly contradictory findings on the effects of divided government. 
 
Previous Measures of Divided Government 
At first glance, divided government appears to be a rather simple concept to 
operationalize.  When the president of the United States is of one party and the other 
party controls both chambers of Congress, divided government exists.7  Given the 
apparent simplicity of measuring the phenomenon, the vast majority of scholars employ a 
dummy variable to measure divided and unified government.8  Early work on divided 
government (Mayhew 1991; Sundquist 1988) examined the phenomenon using this 
dichotomous variable, with most subsequent researchers utilizing the same measure (Alt 
and Lowry 1994; Binder 1999; Binder 2003; Binder and Maltzman 2002; Brady and 
Volden 2006; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Jones 2001; Krehbiel 1998; Krutz 
2001a; Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998).  Of the dozens of studies that tackle the causes 
and effects of divided party control, relatively few scholars have quantified it using a 
                                                 
 7 If one party controls the House while the other party controls the Senate, then 
another form of divided government, sometimes called “mixed control,” exists.  Most 
studies, however, treat both forms of divided government in the same way.  In the post-
World War II period, “mixed control” only occurred from 1981 to 1986, when the 
Republican Party controlled the presidency (Reagan), the Senate, but not the House of 
Representatives. 
8 Studies that make a distinction between divided control and mixed control 
typically operationalize divided government in the following way: Divided government = 
1, Mixed control = .5, Unified government = 0. 
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variable other than the dummy measure (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Conley 2003; Shipan 
and Shannon 2003).   
While the traditional divided government dummy variable seems straightforward, 
it is not without problems.  This dummy variable is loaded with assumptions that have 
both methodological and theoretical implications.   
Assumptions of the Dummy Variable 
 Although the use of a dummy variable to capture the presence or absence of 
divided government appears to be a methodological choice, the decision to employ such a 
measure is theoretically important as well.  Not only has the literature defined “divided 
government” as “divided party control,” but it has also operationalized divided 
government strictly based on party control.  Given that party control is only one 
component of the larger divided government phenomenon, use of the dummy variable is 
problematic in several meaningful ways. 
The dummy variable (also referred in this dissertation as the “divided government 
dummy variable”) makes two key assumptions, which have both methodological and 
theoretical implications.  The first assumption, as stated above, is that party control of the 
presidency and legislature matters, as this variable takes on a value of 1 or 0 based only 
on whether the party that controls the presidency also controls both chambers of 
Congress.  Implicitly, the dummy variable assumes that the other components discussed 
in the previous chapter do not matter (e.g., ideology) – that it does not matter how much 
the chief executive shares preferences with members of the two parties or with their most 
influential members.  Additionally, it assumes that party control, rather than the degree of 
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party control (“party seats”) matters, as this measure cannot distinguish larger seat 
majorities (deficits) from small ones. 
The second assumption made by use of the dummy variable is that the nature of 
divided government has remained constant.  The use of a dummy variable assumes that 
all periods of unified government and all periods of divided government are equal, as 
they are assigned the same numeric value.  In other words, when examining legislative 
outcomes, the use of a dichotomous variable assumes that the effect of divided 
government on these outcomes is the same during divided government in the 1990s as it 
was during divided government in the 1950s.  If, however, the components of divided 
government have varied in a meaningful way, this assumption would be flawed.   
Whether intentional or not, other scholars have made these assumptions through 
their use of this measure.  There are reasons to question both of these assumptions. 
Challenging the Assumptions of the Divided Government Dummy 
There are many reasons to question the assumptions made by the use of a 
dichotomous measure to capture divided government.  The justification for challenging 
the assumption that only party control matters, rather than something else, is largely 
provided in the previous chapter.  Neither the ideology component of divided government 
nor the seats dimension of the party component is captured by the dummy variable, 
despite the theoretical reasons for believing that each affects legislative outcomes.  
Which component of divided government (party, ideology, both, neither) drives 
legislative outcomes is an empirical question, rather than a conclusion that has been well 
established in the literature. 
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There is a myriad of reasons to question the assumption that divided government 
has not changed over time.  There has been a great deal of variation in the components of 
divided government over time.  Again, if something other than party control matters, then 
this variation should substantively affect legislative outcomes.  It is possible that unified 
government during the Eisenhower administration did not have the same impact on 
legislative outcomes that it does today during the Bush administration, as the result of 
variation in one (or both) of the components.  Similarly, it is possible that, as these 
components of divided government have varied over time, divided government has posed 
more or less of a deleterious political environment.   
Variation in Party Seat Allocations 
In the post-World War II period there have been wide variations in the number of seats that 
the president’s party held in both the House and the Senate.  For example, during 1965-66 
under Lyndon Johnson there were 68 Democratic senators and 295 House members from the 
president’s party.  In 2003 under George W. Bush there were 51 Republican senators and 229 
Republican House members.  Both governed during periods of unified party control, yet on the 
basis of congressional seats held by the party of the president, Johnson was in a much more 
commanding position than was Bush, who had slim majorities in both the House and the 
Senate.  While LBJ could afford to lose members of his own party and still achieve success on 
his legislative agenda, George W. Bush could afford no defections.  Hence, while both 
presidents experienced unified party control, there were important variations in their ability to 
influence Congress.  Yet, a dummy variable treats each case as being the same. 
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Variation in Ideology 
 Along with the variation in seat allocations over time, there has also been a great 
deal of variation in the ideology of members of Congress and presidents in the post-
World War II period.  Chapter 2 reviews the literature on party polarization (Aldrich and 
Battista 2000; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Binder 1999; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Brady and 
Volden 2006; Jones, True, and Baumgartner 1997; Jones 2001; McCarty and Razaghian 
1999), which argues that the average Democrat and the average Republican have become 
ideologically more disparate in recent decades.  The recent polarization of Democratic 
and Republican members of Congress is likely the product of several factors.  First, as 
conservative Southern Democrats were retired from public life by gerrymandering, the 
Democratic Party became more liberal (Lublin and Voss 2003).  Second, Northern 
Democrats become more liberal as well (Brewer, Mariani, and Stonecash 2002).  This 
polarization has left fewer moderates in Congress than there were in the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s.  Further polarization in the 1990s (Bond and Fleisher 2000) means that there 
are also fewer cross-pressured legislatures with whom presidents from opposing parties 
can bargain easily (Bond and Fleisher 1990).   
 The shifting preferences of congressmen became even more pronounced 
following the 1980 elections.  Not only did control of the Senate change from Democratic 
control to Republican control for the first time since 1955, but the preferences of the 
members also shifted.  Brady and Volden (Brady and Volden 2006) describe these 
changes: 
The new Congress differed significantly from the 96th Congress.  The Senate was 
Republican for the first time in twenty-six years; liberal Senators including 
George McGovern (D-SD), Birch Bayh (D-IN), Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), and 
Frank Church (D-ID) had been defeated in 1980.  They were replaced by 
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conservative Senators like Dan Quayle (R-IN), Robert Kasten (R-WI), Steven 
Symms (R-ID), Charles Grassley (R-IA), and James Abdnor (R-SD)….Both the 
mean and the standard deviation show[ed] about a 40 percent drop from any 
Senate scores over the 1969-1980 period….In addition to the Republican 
majority, there were a sufficient number of conservative Democrats to ensure that 
the filibuster could not be used often or effectively. 
 
Thus, dramatic variation exists in the ideological preferences of members of Congress 
over the last 50 years. 
 In addition to shifting ideology of members of Congress, the ideology of 
presidents has also varied widely.  Since World War II, the American people have elected 
strong liberals (such as Kennedy and Clinton), strong conservatives (such as Reagan and 
George W. Bush), as well as more moderate presidents from both political parties 
(Eisenhower and LBJ)9.  Table 3.1 presents presidential ideology (DW-Nominate scores) 
over time.   
- Table 3.1 about here - 
When examining the varying effect of ideology on presidential-congressional outcomes, 
however, one should consider not simply the raw scores of members of Congress and 
presidents, but rather the relative ideological position of these actors over time. 
 Over the last 50 years, the ideological distance between the president and 
Congress has also varied.  Consider the differences between the political environment 
Eisenhower confronted in 1958 and George W. Bush in 2002 (Poole 2003; Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997).  Under Eisenhower, the House and Senate were controlled by the 
Democratic Party, many of whom were conservative Southern Democrats.  Given that 
Eisenhower was fairly moderate, the ideological distance between the president and 
                                                 
9 These classifications of presidential ideologies are based on Poole and 
Rosenthal’s (1997; 2003) DW-Nominate scores.  Negative scores are more liberal, and 
high positive scores represent more conservative individuals.   
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Congress was relatively small.  George W. Bush faced a more contentious political 
environment, with a majority of seats in the Senate held by the Democratic Party 
following the defection of Jim Jeffords.  As Bush is one of the most conservative 
presidents ever, and as the Democrats that controlled the Senate were much more liberal 
than was the Senate under Eisenhower, the ideological distance between the president 
and the Senate was quite large.  Consequently, as the preferences of both the president 
and Congress have varied widely over the last 50 years, so too has the ideological gap 
between the preferences of these actors. 
Variation in the Correlation between Party and Ideology 
Aside from variation in the ideology of members of Congress, the relationship 
between party and ideology of congressmen has also changed over time.  Figure 3.1 
presents the correlation between party and ideology in the House of Representatives over 
time, while Figure 3.2 presents the correlation between party and ideology in the 
Senate10.   
- Figures 3.1 and 3.2 about here - 
As these figures show, partisanship and ideology were not as highly correlated in the 
1950s and 1960s (81st through 91st Congresses).  This is largely the result of the many 
Democratic congressmen, many of whom were from southern states, who had fairly 
conservative ideologies.  However, over the last 25 years, the correlation between party 
and ideology has strengthened as members of Congress have become more ideologically 
                                                 
10 These figures present the correlation (Pearson’s r) between a member’s 
partisanship and his/her ideology, using Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate score 
(Poole 2003; Poole and Rosenthal 1997).   
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polarized (Poole 2003; Poole and Rosenthal 1997).    Table 3.2 presents the mean 
correlation coefficient between party and ideology for each decade since 1950.  
- Table 3.2 about here - 
As the Democratic and Republican congressional delegations have polarized, the 
party label has become more informative (Hager and Talbert 2000).  In the 1950s and 
1960s, knowing a members’ partisanship did not provide as much information about the 
ideology of those members.  Today, however, a member’s partisanship is more strongly 
related to his/her ideology. 
Variation in Chamber Leadership 
In addition to changing preferences among the rank-and-file members of Congress over 
time, there have also been shifts in the chamber leadership.  Consider the effect that 
replacement of more moderate legislators like Robert Dole and Robert Michel with more 
ideological leaders like Trent Lott, Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey and Tom Delay had on politics 
in Washington. A more nuanced measure that captures party change effects, including the 
increasing ideological distance between the two parties’ leadership teams and the president is 
better suited to this purpose. 
Still, as Cox and McCubbins (1993) note, it is the party leadership that sets the political 
agenda and determines the leadership of the congressional committees.  A change from Tom 
Foley to Newt Gingrich therefore could have a major impact on presidential relations with 
Congress, even if there were only a modest corresponding shift in the ideology of the median 
legislator.   
Thus, the ideology of congressional leaders relative to the ideology of the rank-and-file 
members of their party and to the president are meaningful when examining legislative 
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outcomes.  Additionally, the ideology of these leaders can vary widely as a result of electoral 
and idiosyncratic factors. 
Variation in Committee Leadership 
As with the ideology of these other members, the preferences of committee 
chairman have also varied widely in this time period.  During the Kennedy 
administration, many of the committee chairmen were Southern Democrats whose 
preferences were far from those of the president.  Contrast this situation with that faced 
by Bill Clinton from 1993 to 1994.  Although both presidents governed during periods of 
unified party control, the committee chairmen during Clinton’s first two years were much 
more liberal.  As a result, the ideological distance between the president and these 
members of Congress was much smaller.  This example is demonstrative of a recent trend 
in the preferences of committee chairmen.   
Before the committee reforms of 1975, committee chairmen were selected based 
on seniority.  Following these reforms, both the Democratic and Republican parties were 
freer to select committee chairmen that were more ideologically extreme.  As with the 
dramatic shift in preferences of the average member following the 1980 election, the 
committee chairmen in the 97th Congress (1981-82) differed greatly from the chairmen 
controlling the congressional committees in the 96th Congress (1979-80).  Strong liberals 
were replaced in the 97th Congress by much more conservative members (Brady and 
Volden 2006).  Both political parties have selected much more extreme committee 
chairmen in recent years.  As the committee chairmen shift from moderates to more 
extreme members of the majority party, legislation may shift from the ideal point of the 
median member of the legislature to a point closer to the preferred point of the committee 
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chairman.  If this is occurs, then a shift in the ideology of the committee chairmen may 
affect legislative outcomes, even when no shift in the membership of the chamber has 
occurred.  As such, not only is there variation in this component of divided government, 
but this variation is important in terms of legislative outcomes (Epstein and O'Halloran 
1999). 
Hence, while the vast majority of studies of divided government employ this 
dummy variable, previous scholars have not tested the assumptions that are inherent to 
this measure. 
Other Problems with the Dummy Variable 
Aside from issues related to the assumptions made by the dichotomous measure, 
there also are serious problems with the use of a dummy variable to measure divided 
government in the post-World War II time period.  First, prior to Bill Clinton’s 
presidency, all Democratic presidents since Harry Truman (Kennedy, Johnson and 
Carter) governed during times of unified party control, while all of the Republican 
presidents (Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush) governed during 
periods of divided party control, most for a majority of their time in the White House.  
Therefore, as Mayer (1999) asserts, “Simply testing for differences between presidents 
under divided and unified [party control] is no different than testing for differences 
between Democratic and Republican presidents…”.  While the Clinton presidency now 
provides us with a Democratic President and a Republican controlled Congress, and 
George W. Bush a Republican president and a Republican Congress, the use of a dummy 
variable to measure divided government in the pre-Clinton period may be picking up only 
the difference between Democratic and Republican administrations. 
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Measuring the Components of Divided Government 
The inclusion of more nuanced and theoretically appropriate measures will allow 
for the relative test between the components of divided government.  Party control is the 
easiest component to quantify, as the president’s party controls a legislative chamber or it 
does not.  I employ a dichotomous variable to capture party control, where the variable 
takes on a value of 1 when the president’s party controls the legislative chamber and 0 
when the president’s party does not control that chamber.  Again, this dummy variable 
capturing party control is operationalized in exactly the same way as the “divided 
government dummy variable” that has been used in the majority of studies on this topic 
to quantify “divided government.”  This dissertation contributes to the literature by 
expanding the definition of divided government to more accurately capture the level of 
congruence or adversity between the president and Congress.  In doing so, I will not use 
dummy variables aside from the party control dummy variable, but rather continuous 
measures that contain high levels of variation. 
Measuring Party Seat Allocations 
As discussed in Chapter Two, there are two dimensions to the party component of 
divided government.  In addition to simple party control, as discussed and operationalized 
above, the strength of party control is also meaningful.  This second dimension of the party 
component is operationalized based on the percentage of each legislative chamber that is 
controlled by the president’s party.    
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It usually is not difficult to measure the party seat allocations in the House and 
Senate11.  The data on these breakdowns are readily available (Ragsdale 1996).  As this 
research examines presidential-congressional relations, I consider the percentage of seats 
controlled by the president’s party and by the opposition party.  More specifically, I examine 
the percentage of seats held by the president’s party in both the House and the Senate: that is, 
the percentage of seats held by the president’s party minus the percentage of seats held by the 
opposition party.  This variable takes on a positive value when the president’s party holds the 
chamber majority and a negative value when the opposition holds the majority of seats.  As 
such, this provides a continuous measure of the party component, as opposed to the 
dichotomous measure that typically has been used in the past.  The percentage of seats held by 
the president’s party in the House and Senate are presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. 
- Figures 3.3 and 3.4 about here - 
Measuring Ideology and Leadership 
Previous scholarship has operationalized ideology in a variety of ways.  One 
could include measures that capture the ideology of the median legislator in Congress 
(Brady and Volden 2006; Shipan and Shannon 2003), the median member of the majority 
party (Conley 2003), or the ideology of certain “pivotal” members of the system (Brady 
and Volden 2006; Epstein, Kristensen, and O'Halloran Forthcoming; Krehbiel 1998).  
These ideology scores could be included by themselves, or these variables could be 
                                                 
11 Measuring seat allocations can be more complicated at times, as it is possible 
for the number of seats held by the president’s party to shift over a two-year period.   
Members of Congress occasionally die in office, retire from public life, leave Congress to 
seek a different political office, or are selected by the president to fill an executive branch 
position.  While these seats are vacant, or when someone from an opposing party replaces 
these members, the allocations can change.  Seat allocations can also change when a 
member of Congress changes his/her party affiliation, as was the case when James 
Jeffords (Vermont) defected from the Republican Party to an Independent affiliation. 
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subtracted from the president’s ideology score to capture the ideological distance 
between the president and these actors.  As this research seeks to determine the level of 
presidential-congressional adversity, it seems most appropriate to include measures of 
ideological distance, so that we have a variable that quantifies the level of harmony or 
discord between the policy preferences of the president and Congress12. 
While these ideology measures capture the ideological distance between the 
president and Congress, and how this distance varies over time, they are not without 
limitations.  Using the median member of the majority party as the “key” actor, like the 
divided government dummy variable, assumes that party control matters.  As the aim of 
these measures is to avoid making the assumptions of the divided government dummy 
variable, using the median member of the majority party is problematic.  Another 
problem endemic to several of these ideology members is that they do not vary within 
congressional sessions.  Although the distance between the president and these key actors 
vary over time, they rarely vary within a two-year period13.  In this research, I include the 
ideological distance between the president and the median legislator in some models. 
                                                 
12 This research uses the absolute distance because we do not care whether 
Congress is more conservative or liberal than the president, only that its ideology is 
different from it.  That is, I do not hypothesize that presidents that are far more liberal 
than members of Congress are more or less disadvantaged than those who are more 
conservative than members of Congress, though this may in fact be an interesting 
question for further research.   
13 It is possible to construct a model based on the Krehbiel “pivotal politics” 
model that would vary based on the specific issue area.  To do so, one would need to sort 
members on more than just the traditional one dimension of preferences used to calculate 
ideology.  If the median legislator, the veto pivot, and the filibuster pivot were allowed to 
vary based on the content of the specific legislation, these measures would vary both 
across congressional sessions and within sessions.  This would strengthen their 
applicability to different studies and data sets. 
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Measuring chamber leadership and committee leadership is more complicated.  
One possibility would be to include measures that capture the power of the chamber 
leadership and committee chairmen.  However, the powers of these have not varied much 
over the last 50 years14.  These leaders have varied in terms of their policy preferences, 
especially when compared to the preferences of other political actors.  As with the 
previous measures that capture the ideological distance between key actors and the 
president, the same can be done with the chamber leadership and committee chairmen.  
Figure 3.5 presents the ideological distance between the president and the Speaker of the 
House, and Figure 3.6 presents the ideological distance between the president and the 
Senate Majority Leader.  Similarly, Figures 3.7 and 3.8 display the distance between the 
president and the average chairmen of the standing committees in the House and the 
Senate15.   
- Figures 3.5 through 3.8 about here - 
While each of these measures is incorporated into some of the models, I focus on the 
distance between the president and committee chairmen.  These committee chairmen are 
critical actors in the system.  Almost all legislation is referred to committee, and the vast 
majority of this legislation fails at this stage of the legislative process.  Thus, the 
ideological distance between these actors and the president are expected to affect 
legislative outcomes.  Chapter 5 examines several recent examples in much more detail, 
                                                 
14 While the powers themselves have not changed greatly, the use of these powers 
by the leadership has varied more widely.  This variation is likely the product of 
leadership preferences, rather than what is driving leadership behavior. 
15 As new standing committees are created, old ones are abolished, or in some 
cases names are changed or committees are consolidated, the total number of standing 
committees across Congresses often changes.  I examine the chairs of all of the standing 
committees in the Senate and the House. Names of the committee chairs and leaders were 
derived from the Congressional Directory for each Congress in the data set. 
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illuminating the expected impact of committee chairmen ideology on outcomes.    
Additionally, use of the committee chairmen scores allows for theoretically driven 
variation within each congressional session, as each piece of legislation can be tied to 
specific committees and their respective chairs.  As with some of the other ideological 
distance measures, the chamber leadership does not vary within a congressional session.  
Given that the intention here is to explain variation both across legislative sessions and 
within legislative sessions across issue areas, the committee chairmen are the more 
appropriate congressional actors to include in the present analyses. 
Over the course of the post-WWII time period, the distance measures are consistent 
with prior expectations regarding divided government: there is usually greater ideological 
distance between the president and the committee chairs in times of divided party control than 
there is in periods of unified party control.  However, there is also a great deal of variation in 
these measures, both during periods of unified and divided party control.  These variables allow 
for examination of the effect of this variation on legislative outcomes.  A perusal of Figures 3.7 
and 3.8 shows that the ideological difference between the president and the committee chairs 
has increased considerably over time.  When Kennedy became president in 1961, representing 
a shift from divided to unified party control, there was relatively little change in the ideological 
distance between the president and the average committee chair in Congress16.  Rather than 
decreasing, as one would expect, the distance actually increased slightly from .22 (Eisenhower 
and the 86th Congress) to .24 (Kennedy and the 87th Congress).  The explanation is that 
conservative Southern Democrats largely controlled the leadership of Congress and its 
committees.  Hence, while Kennedy was operating in a period of unified government, the 
                                                 
16 This ideological distance will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. 
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ideological adversity that he faced was similar to that of his Republican predecessor.  The next 
shift to divided party control occurred with Nixon in 1969.  Here the shift was larger, from .05 
(Lyndon Johnson and the 90th Congress) to .38 (Nixon and the 91st Congress).  With the move 
to unified party control following Carter’s election in 1976, we witnessed a similar shift (from 
.34 to .09).  With the arrival of Ronald Reagan in 1981, however, the magnitude of the shift 
increased dramatically.  The ideological distance between Carter and the average committee 
chairs in the 96th Congress was only .03, while for Reagan and the 97th Congress it was .8517.  
The transition from George H. W. Bush to Clinton in 1993 (.81 to .02) was accompanied by a 
shift similar to 1981.  Likewise, the Republican takeover in the 104th Congress in 1995 
increased the ideological distance for Clinton from (.02 to .77).   
Again, these new measures of ideological adversity contain a great deal of variation 
over time, raising the possibility that the partisan and ideological components of divided 
government pose a worse political environment today than they did earlier in the 20th century.  
The variation in these components, along with different scholars examining different segments 
of this longer time period, may help explain some of the contradictory findings that dominate 
the divided government literature. 
 
Examining Aggregate-Level Dependent Variables 
These measures of adversity - by way of the components of divided government - 
are relatively straightforward when examining outcomes that only involve one legislative 
chamber.  Several presidential-congressional variables are specific to one legislative 
chamber.  In the Senate, this includes the duration and outcome of presidential nominees 
                                                 
17 This shift is consistent with the changes noted by Brady and Volden (2006) 
about the changes linked to the 1980 election. 
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for executive and judicial branch vacancies, treaties, and the outcome of legislation in the 
Senate (including legislative failure via filibuster).  Although the House does not play a 
role in the confirmation process for nominees or treaties, examining whether legislation 
successfully makes it though the House would be another example of single-chamber 
outcomes. 
 For these single-chamber variables, measures of the components of divided 
government can be used.  When, for example, a researcher is examining the confirmation 
process for judicial nominees, s/he can employ measures of party control, party seat 
allocations, chamber leadership, and committee leadership in the Senate.  However, 
measuring presidential-congressional adversity is much more difficult when examining 
outcomes that span both legislative chambers. 
 The problem in dealing with dual-chamber outcomes is in reconciling the 
differences between the two chambers.  Krehbiel (1998) circumvents the problems 
associated with a two-chamber system by developing a rational choice model of 
presidential-congressional interaction using a hypothetical unicameral legislature.  While 
this parsimonious model allows Krehbiel to avoid pitfalls associated with bicameral 
differences, it is obviously unrealistic in the American context (Chiou and Rothenberg 
2003; Epstein, Kristensen, and O'Halloran Forthcoming).18  As such, Krehbiel overcomes 
the problem of a bicameral system without solving the problem itself.  How, then, can 
scholars deal with the American bicameral system without simply imposing an artificial 
unicameral legislature? 
                                                 
18 The national legislature, as well as nearly all of the state legislatures, is 
bicameral.  The Nebraska state legislature is the lone exception in the American context. 
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One solution would be to take the average value of the two chambers for each 
variable of interest.  However, as Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997) note, “there is no clear 
manner of averaging percentages of party majorities in each house, especially in 1981-1986 
when different parties were in the majority of each house.”  To average across chambers creates 
an atheoretical measure that does not adequately reflect seat allocations in either chamber, let 
alone the entire Congress.  A second solution to this problem is to only use the values for either 
the House or the Senate, but not both.  However, only including values for one chamber 
without a reason to do so is also atheoretical.     
Measures of “Greater Adversity” 
 In this research, I overcome this difficult methodological hurdle by making a 
theoretically driven choice between the values of two legislative chambers.  Given that this 
research examines legislative outcomes, many of which must successfully pass in both the 
House and the Senate, one solution is to examine the chamber that poses the greater obstacle to 
presidential-congressional relations.  If the “more adverse” chamber still does not present a 
deleterious environment for presidential-congressional relations, the legislative process should 
run relatively smoothly.  When, however, one legislative chamber is highly averse to working 
with the president, we should expect high levels of gridlock and low levels of legislative 
productivity. 
During the Reagan administration, concerns about the filibuster aside, the House of 
Representatives had the greater potential to block legislation that the president supported from 
1981-1986, particularly since Democratic controlled committees could block legislation from 
ever reaching the House floor.  On the other hand, following the defection of Senator James 
Jeffords to the Democratic Party in 2001, George W. Bush had a greater political affinity with 
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his partisans in the House than he did with the Senate.  This is not to say that the Senate under 
Reagan or the House under Bush posed no obstacles to the president’s agenda.  However, these 
chambers were likely more favorable for presidential-congressional relations.  Therefore, I 
conceptualize the two chambers in terms of their potential opposition to the president’s 
program; that is, which chamber is likely to provide the greater impediment to the president.  
These measures are referred to as the Greater Adversity measures, for each of the components 
of divided government included in the models.   
Party Control 
Measuring party control in aggregate models is straightforward, as the president’s 
party either controls both chambers of Congress or it does not.  Here, the dummy variable 
that is traditionally used to measure divided government is actually appropriate.  This 
variable takes on a value of 1 when the president’s party controls both chambers of 
Congress (i.e. unified government) and a value of 0 when the opposition party controls at 
least one chamber of the legislature.  One could also use a measure that allows for 
“mixed control,” where the president’s party controls one, but not both, legislative 
chamber. 
Party Seat Allocations 
To measure seat allocations for legislative outcomes that span both chambers, a 
Greater Adversity Seats Measure can be created.  To do so, I select the chamber (House or 
Senate) where the opposition party holds a greater percentage of seats to develop a measure of 
greater seats adversity, a measure of the chamber that represents the greater impediment to the 
president for each session of Congress.  Figure 3.9 presents a graph of this measure.   
- Figure 3.9 about here - 
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Not surprisingly, the data show that presidents who govern during divided government must 
deal with a larger number of members of the opposition party (at least in one of the 
congressional chambers).  While the measure thus provides a certain degree of face validity, 
there are limitations to this measure.  There is still some measurement error, since it is more 
difficult to pick up the votes of one percent of House seats (4.35 House members) than it is to 
convince one percent of Senators (one Senator) to switch their vote.  Thus, even a slightly 
higher percentage of seats in the Senate may not represent as much of a threat to presidential 
success as a smaller seat percentage in the House.  While this certainly introduces measurement 
error, its greatest impact will be in those cases where the House and Senate seat allocations are 
nearly evenly split between the two parties. 
It is also possible that the threat to presidential-congressional relations does not 
manifest itself through seat allocations, but rather vis-à-vis the minority party’s use of the 
filibuster in the Senate.  If the House of Representatives is identified as the more adverse 
chamber by the Greater Adversity Seats Measure, as it was during the Reagan 
administration, there may still be instances where the president and the Senate are at odds 
with one another.  For example, if the Democrats in the Senate filibustered legislation 
that the president supported, then the House may not be the most adverse chamber.  In 
this event, the “greater adversity” measure would be a conservative measure of 
presidential-congressional discord. 
Ideology and Leadership 
As with the measure of seat allocations, the Greater Adversity Ideology measures are 
conceptualized as the ideological distance between the president and members of Congress in 
terms of the chamber that represents the greater impediment to presidential-congressional 
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relations.  From this perspective, the greater the ideological distance in one chamber, the less 
amenable it should be to successful work between these actors.  In developing these measures, I 
include measures of the ideological distance between the president and three of the actors 
described above: (1) the median legislator, (2) the chamber leadership, and (3) the committee 
chairmen19.  Increased ideological distance between any of these leaders and the president 
should negatively impact presidential-congressional relations.  Figures 3.10-3.12 present the 
various Greater Adversity Ideology Measures.   
- Figures 3.10 through 3.12 about here - 
Measures of “Lesser Resistance” 
Selecting the chamber that presents the most adverse political environment for the 
president and Congress is not the only option.  Alternatively, one could select the legislative 
chamber that presents the smallest amount of adversity between these actors.    As any 
legislation must pass through both chambers for success, considering the chamber that poses 
the “lesser resistance” to presidential-congressional relations serves as the lowest threshold that 
must be cleared for any chance of passage.  When the distance between the president and 
Congress is small in the “lesser resistant” chamber, productivity should have a much higher 
likelihood than when the lesser resistant chamber still poses an adverse political environment.  
This represents the cases where presidents have the greater opportunity for legislative success.  
In addition to having the greater opportunity for passage of favorable legislation, the “lesser 
resistance” chamber also represents the body in which the president has the greater ability to 
                                                 
19 In models that examine aggregate-level outcomes (Chapter 4), the Greater 
Adversity Ideology measure captures the distance between the president and the average 
chairmen of the standing committees in that chamber.  In models that examine individual-
level outcomes (Chapter 5), the Greater Adversity Ideology measure incorporates the 
ideology of the chairman of the referring committee(s). 
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block legislation that he does not endorse.  It is also possible that achieving legislative success 
in one chamber may put additional pressure on the other one to act. 
These measures are constructed in a similar fashion to the Greater Adversity measures 
described above.  First, the chamber in which the president’s party contains the largest 
percentage of seats is used to calculate the Lesser Resistance Seats measure.  If the president’s 
party does not have a majority of seats in either legislative chamber, this ideological distance 
will be larger, making presidential-congressional relations more difficult.  The Lesser 
Resistance Ideology measures are created by determining the legislative chamber in which the 
ideological distance between the president and Congress is the smallest for that time period.  
Figure 3.13 presents the Lesser Resistance Seats Measure, and Figures 3.14-3.16 present the 
Lesser Resistance Ideology Measures. 
- Figures 3.13 through 3.16 about here - 
By employing either the Greater Adversity or Lesser Resistance measures, I can 
examine the relative effect of the components of divided government on legislative outcomes. 
  
Conclusions 
 Almost all of the previous studies of divided government (both as an independent 
and as a dependent variable) have defined the phenomenon as simply a function of party 
control.  As a result, the literature has tended to examine the phenomenon using a 
dichotomous variable.  This dummy variable takes on a value of “1” when divided party 
control exists, and “0” when unified party control exists.  While the choice of measures 
appears to be only a methodological one, it also has theoretical implications.  The use of a 
dichotomous variable makes two key assumptions about divided government.  First, it 
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assumes that party control, rather than the other components of divided government, is 
driving results.  There is a wealth of literature that asserts that the strength of the party 
majority and the ideology of key members of Congress may affect legislative outcomes, 
suggesting that this assumption needs further examination.  The second assumption of the 
divided government dummy variable is that the effects of divided government have been 
consistent over time (i.e. all periods of unified government and all periods of divided 
government are the same).  If this assumption is correct, then the effects of divided 
government on legislative outcomes in the 1950s should be the same as the effect of 
divided government on outcomes in the 1990s and 2000s.  Yet, the components of 
divided government have varied widely over the last 50 years, raising concerns over this 
second assumption.  This, too, is an empirical question that should be tested. 
By incorporating measures of the components of divided government, rather than 
a measure that only captures party control, I seek to test these assumptions to see whether 
divided government truly poses a more deleterious political environment for presidential-
congressional relations.  These measures allow for the relative test of the components of 
divided government, overcoming both the methodological and theoretical limitations 
inherent in this vast literature.   
Additionally, the Greater Adversity and Lesser Resistance measures allow for the 
examination of the components of divided government and outcomes involving both a 
single legislative chamber and both legislative chambers.  I first employ these measures 
in models that analyze aggregate-level legislative outcomes (Chapter 4).  I then examine 
the effect of the components of divided government on individual roll-call votes (Chapter 
5). 
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TABLES AND FIGURES: CHAPTER 3 
 
TABLES: 
 
TABLE 3.1: PRESIDENTIAL IDEOLOGY (DW-NOMINATE 
SCORES) 
  
Eisenhower 0.318
Kennedy -0.547
Johnson -0.314
Nixon 0.454
Ford 0.349
Carter -0.475
Reagan 0.564
H.W. Bush 0.463
Clinton -0.475
W. Bush 0.562
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TABLE 3.2: AVERAGE PARTY-IDEOLOGY CORRELATION BY DECADE 
Decade House Senate 
1950s .7582 .6865 
1960s .7936 .7192 
1970s .7991 .7421 
1980s .8567 .8446 
1990s .8869 .9001 
2000s .9092 .8423 
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FIGURES: 
 
FIGURE 3.1: PARTY / IDEOLOGY CORRELATION - HOUSE (DW-NOMINATE) 
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FIGURE 3.2: PARTY / IDEOLOGY CORRELATION - SENATE (DW-NOMINATE) 
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FIGURE 3.3: PERCENTAGE OF SEATS HELD BY PRESIDENT’S PARTY - HOUSE 
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FIGURE 3.4: PERCENTAGE OF SEATS HELD BY PRESIDENT’S PARTY - SENATE 
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FIGURE 3.5: IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND SPEAKER OF THE 
HOUSE 
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FIGURE 3.6: IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND SENATE MAJORITY 
LEADER 
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FIGURE 3.7: IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND COMMITTEE 
CHAIRMEN - HOUSE 
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FIGURE 3.8: IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND COMMITTEE 
CHAIRMEN - SENATE 
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FIGURE 3.9: GREATER ADVERSITY SEATS MEASURE 
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FIGURE 3.10: GREATER ADVERSITY IDEOLOGY MEASURE – MEDIAN MEMBER 
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FIGURE 3.11: GREATER ADVERSITY IDEOLOGY MEASURE – CHAMBER LEADERSHIP 
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FIGURE 3.12: GREATER ADVERSITY IDEOLOGY MEASURE – COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN 
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FIGURE 3.13: LESSER RESISTANCE SEATS MEASURE 
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FIGURE 3.14: LESSER RESISTANCE IDEOLOGY MEASURE – MEDIAN MEMBER 
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FIGURE 3.15: LESSER RESISTANCE IDEOLOGY MEASURE – CHAMBER LEADERSHIP 
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FIGURE 3.16: LESSER RESISTANCE IDEOLOGY MEASURE – COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Effects of Adversity: Aggregate Models of Legislative Outcomes 
(1945-2002) 
 
Key questions: 
• What effect do the components of divided government have on aggregate-level 
legislative outcomes? 
• Do the results of aggregate-level models support the assumptions made by the 
traditional dummy variable used in most divided government studies? 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the political science literature has yet to reach a 
consensus about the effects of divided government.  While there is empirical evidence 
that divided government hampers presidential-congressional relations (Binder 1999; 
Binder 2003; Cutler 1988; Edwards 1976; Sundquist 1988), there is also much support to 
the contrary (Jones 1994; Mayhew 1991).  It is possible that the seemingly contradictory 
findings are the result of the way in which divided government is defined and measured.  
The dichotomous variable typically employed in the literature fails to account for the 
various components of divided government, and assumes that the phenomenon of divided 
government has remained constant over time.  Chapter Three discussed the limitations of 
the traditional definition and measure of divided government, and offered ways to 
operationalize the components of divided government. 
 In this chapter, I avoid making the assumptions that plague the literature on 
divided government by examining the effect of the components of divided government on 
legislative outcomes.  Additionally, I consider whether divided government creates a 
similar political environment today as it did earlier in the post-World War II period.  To 
test the effect of the components of divided government on legislative outcomes, I 
employ three dependent variables that have been used in seminal studies of presidential-
congressional relations: presidential success in Congress, the amount of significant 
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legislation that is enacted by Congress, and the amount of legislation that fails in 
Congress.  The presidential success rate models are derived from Bond and Fleisher’s 
book The President in the Legislative Arena (1990), the amount of significant legislation 
that Congress enacts re-examines Mayhew’s (1991) study, and the amount of failed 
legislation is based on the work of Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997).20 
Each of these three dependent variables will be examined at the aggregate-level, 
with the two-year Congress serving as the unit of analysis.  Additionally, each of these 
variables considers outcomes that span both legislative chambers, looking at the entire 
Congress together rather than the House and Senate separately.  Given this unit of 
analysis, and the fact that these models combine the outcomes of the House and Senate 
into a single measure, I employ the Greater Adversity and Lesser Resistance measures 
introduced in the previous chapter. 
For each of the three dependent variables, I run four OLS regression models.  The 
first model examines the bivariate relationship between the traditional divided 
government dummy variable and the dependent variable.  While I do not fully replicate 
the original model offered by each of these previous studies, the effect of divided party 
control (which they call “divided government”) on the dependent variable should be 
consistent with previous findings.  The second model seeks to test whether the effects of 
divided party control on the dependent variable have been consistent over time.  To 
                                                 
20 Given that I am replicating these studies, with some adjustments, the unit of 
analysis and number of observations small (under 30) in each model.  Some of the 
original models in these books have even fewer observations, as they were published in 
the early 1990s.  The authors have continued to collect these data, and made them 
available for download online.  This allows me to re-examine their dependent variables 
over a slightly expanded time period.  Additionally, I have run diagnostics for each model 
to ensure that the results are not skewed by the presence of outliers in these limited data. 
 77  
illustrate the possible shift over time, I break the traditional dummy variable into two 
separate dummy variables.  The reason for replacing one dummy variable with two 
dummy variables is it allows an examination of potential changes in the effects of divided 
government over time.  The third model includes the Greater Adversity Ideology and 
Greater Adversity Seats measures, as well as several control variables.  The fourth model 
substitutes the Lesser Resistance Ideology and Lesser Resistance Seats measures, also 
including the control variables.   
Control Variables 
In each model, I include a series of control variables that previous scholars have found 
to impact presidential-congressional outcomes: presidential approval rating, the national 
budgetary situation, and bicameral differences.  The effect of presidential approval ratings on 
congressional voting with the president was examined in numerous studies (Brace and 
Hinckley 1991; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Edwards 1989; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rivers and 
Rose 1985).  These studies found that the presidential approval rating impacts roll-call voting 
with the president, if only at the margins (Edwards 1989).  Given that the unit of analysis for 
the three dependent variables examined in the chapter is at the level of each Congress, I include 
the mean presidential approval rating over the two-year period.   
Several important works have controlled for the national budgetary situation.  Most 
notably, Mayhew (1991) and Binder (2003) included measures of the national budgetary 
situation in their models, arguing that a more favorable budgetary situation may positively 
affect presidential success rates.  While both the Mayhew variable and the Binder variable are 
similar, I use Binder’s budgetary situation variable as it extends throughout the course of the 
entire time period of this research.   
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Lastly, I include Binder’s (2003) measure of bicameral differences.  Binder argues that 
when disagreement between the House and the Senate is high, we should expect higher levels 
of gridlock.  This measure captures differences or agreement between the House and the Senate 
by examining voting behavior in conference report votes.  This variable takes on a high value 
when members of the House and Senate do not vote in the same direction on a conference 
report, and a low value when the two chambers are in agreement.  In examining the 
presidential-congressional relationship and its effect on legislative outcomes, it is especially 
important to control for disagreement that arises within Congress itself.  As the approval of both 
chambers is necessary for legislative outcomes, divergent policy preferences may shape each of 
the three dependent variables examined here.  This inter-chamber disagreement would hinder 
legislative productivity without being the product of the presidential-congressional dynamic.  
For that reason, bicameral differences is an important control in the present research. 
This discussion of control variables has two notable omissions: Mayhew’s (1991) 
variables capturing the “start of term” and “activist mood” periods.  Many scholars who 
re-examined the conclusions of Mayhew fully replicated his models, including each of 
his variables (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997).  However, there is considerable 
theoretical justification for excluding these variables.  The start of term dummy variable 
is supposed to capture a honeymoon effect, as we should expect higher legislative success 
at the beginning of a president’s term.  Higher presidential success during the first two 
years of a president’s term than during the last two years is largely the product of seat 
allocations.  As the president’s party has, with rare exceptions, lost seats in Congress 
during the midterm election, much of this start of term effect may be captured by the 
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seats measures21.  The second variable, Mayhew’s “activist mood” measure, is more 
problematic.  Mayhew included this measure to capture a period where a substantially 
higher amount of legislation passed in Congress (Mayhew 1991).  As Epstein, 
Kristensen, and O’Halloran (Forthcoming) note, this “the activist mode variable seems to 
be arbitrarily defined by the empirical surge in legislation in the 1960’s and in the first 
half of the 1970’s. Since the variable lacks a theoretical foundation it seems somewhat 
problematic to rely on model specifications that include it.”  In other words, this variable 
explains variation, but is not theoretically driven.  For this reason, I do not include this 
atheorical measure in the subsequent models. 
Pre-1981 & Post-1981 Dummy Variables 
In addition to the main explanatory variables and the control variables, I also 
include two other variables (in Model 2, as stated above): a pre-1981 divided party 
control dummy variable and a post-1981 divided party control dummy variable22.  Again, 
this party control dummy variable has, in previous scholarship, been used to quantify 
“divided government.”  These variables are included in Model 2 for each of the 
dependent variables, in lieu of the traditional divided government dummy variable.    
These two dummy variables are included to illustrate whether the effects of party control has 
been consistent in the pre-1981 and post-1981 period.  If in the models one of these two 
dummy variables is significant, while the other is not, then the effect of divided party control 
has varied over the course of the 1945 to 2002 time period.  Given that previous scholars have 
                                                 
21 The models were also run with a “start of term” dummy variable included. The 
substantive results do not change when this variable is omitted. 
22 The pre-1981 variable is coded “1” in periods of divided party control before 
1981, and “0” during unified party control as well as periods of divided party control that 
occur from 1981-2000.  The post-1981 dummy is coded in a similar fashion, coded as a 
“1” only in post-1981 periods of divided party control. 
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examined different time periods, it is possible that their findings and conclusions are time 
contingent.   
These two dummy variables are broken at 1981 for several reasons.  First, much has 
been written about the shift that occurred following the 1980 presidential and congressional 
elections.  As discussed in Chapter 3, 1981 marked a sharp change in the ideology of the 
president, the ideology of Congress as a whole, and the ideology of committee chairmen 
(Brady and Volden 2006).  The 1980 election also resulted in the first Republican-held Senate 
since the Eisenhower administration.  Additionally, the 97th Congress marked the first full 
period of divided party control following the committee reforms of 1975, allowing committee 
chairmen to be selected by party caucuses rather than by seniority.  Finally, the 1981 breakpoint 
conveniently divides the post-World War II period nearly in half. 
 
Presidential Success with Congress 
 The first set of models examines presidential success rates in Congress from 
1953-1996.  This is measured as the average presidential success rate for Congress: 
(Success rate in the House + success rate in the Senate)/2.23  To determine the success 
rate for the president in each chamber, one must first identify roll-call votes on which the 
president has a stated position.  The success rate is then calculated by dividing the 
number of roll-calls that the president receives his preferred outcome by the total number 
                                                 
23 The dependent variable averages the value for the House and the Senate.  I use 
this combined dependent variable, rather than running separate models for the House and 
Senate, as it is most comparable with the other dependent variables examined in this 
chapter.  The other two dependent variables, the number of major legislative enactments 
and the number of legislative failures, deal with outcomes that span both chambers.  
Thus, to evaluate the results of separate House and Senate models with respect to the 
other two models, which examine outcomes that span both bodies, would be more 
difficult. 
 81  
of votes on which s/he has a stated position24.  Bond and Fleisher (1990) provide a 
thorough justification of this measure, and why it is superior to others (such as 
“presidential box scores”).   
In their book, Bond and Fleisher (1990) conclude that presidential success is 
significantly hampered by the presence of divided government.  According to this 
seminal study, when the president does not have a majority of seats in both chambers of 
Congress (referred to as “minority presidents”), his success rate drops significantly.  In 
addition to the traditional divided party control dummy variable, Bond and Fleisher 
(1990) also include a measure that combines both party seats and ideology.  They break 
members of Congress into four camps: the president’s base (those who vote with the 
president’s party a majority of the time), cross-pressured members of the president’s 
party (those that vote more with the majority of the opposition party than with the 
president’s party), cross-pressured members of the opposition party (those that vote more 
with the majority of the president’s party than with the opposition party), and the 
opposition party’s base (those that vote with the opposition party a majority of the time).  
As the voting behavior of these members manifests itself in the Poole and Rosenthal DW-
Nominate scores, these seat allocations are essentially constructed based on ideology.  As 
the president has a larger base, s/he likely has a larger group of members that are 
ideologically proximal.  When Congress is comprised of a larger portion of cross-
pressured members, there are likely more moderates (more conservative Democrats, and 
more liberal Republicans).  A large opposition base presents the president with the largest 
                                                 
24 This variable is a percentage, on a 0 to 1 scale.  The values of this variable 
range from .455 (100th Congress) to .875 (88th Congress). 
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impediment to success in Congress, likely facing a legislature that is further ideologically 
from his/her own position. 
Building on this work, I employ OLS regression to re-examine the Bond and 
Fleisher data, which they have extended through 1996.25  I first examine the bivariate 
relationship between divided party control and presidential success rate, then consider 
whether the effect of divided party control on this dependent variable has been consistent 
over time, and finally expand the model to include both components of divided 
government.  I replicate the work of Bond & Fleisher (1990), though I substitute my seats 
and ideology for the Bond and Fleisher seats measure.  Given that party seats and 
ideology are theoretically distinct components, I prefer separate measures so that the 
relative effects can be better understood.  With respect to these models, I present 7 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Divided Party Control Dummy – In the bivariate models, I expect a 
negative relationship between the divided party control dummy variable and 
presidential concurrence rates.   
Hypothesis 1b: Divided Party Control Dummy – In the multivariate models, I do not 
expect to find a significant relationship between divided party control and the 
dependent variable when I control for seats and ideology. 
Hypothesis 2: Pre-1981 and Post-1981 Divided Party Control Dummy Variables – 
The effects of divided party control have not been constant over time.  Because of the 
more hostile political environment in Washington today (see (Brady and Volden 2006; 
Kernell 1986)), I expect to find that there is no significant relationship between pre-
                                                 
25 These data were updated by the author, and obtained via Richard Fleisher’s web 
site (http://www.fordham.edu/politicalsci/profs/fleisher/richfleisher.html). 
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1981 divided party control and the dependent variable.  I expect to find a negative 
relationship between post-1981 divided party control and presidential success in 
Congress.  If party control only exerts a significant influence on the dependent variable 
during one time period, then the effect of divided party control has not been constant 
over time. 
Hypothesis 3: Greater Adversity Party Seats – Seats adversity will negatively affect 
presidential success in Congress.  As the president’s party faces a larger seat deficit (in 
the chamber with the largest seat deficit), his overall success rate in Congress should 
decrease. 
Hypothesis 4: Greater Adversity Ideology - Ideological adversity will 
negatively affect presidential success in Congress.  As the distance between the 
preferences of the president and committee chairmen increases, the president’s 
success rate should decrease.   
Hypothesis 5: Lesser Resistance Party Seats – Seats adversity will negatively affect 
presidential success in Congress.  As the president’s party faces a larger seat deficit (in 
the chamber where he has the most seats), his overall success rate in Congress should 
decrease. 
Hypothesis 6: Lesser Resistance Ideology – Ideological adversity will negatively 
affect presidential success in Congress.  As the distance between the preferences of 
the president and committee chairmen increases, the president’s success rate 
should decrease.   
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Hypothesis 7: Presidential Approval Rating – Presidential approval will positively 
affect presidential success in Congress.  Higher levels of presidential approval should 
increase legislative success, even if only “at the margins.” 
The results of these models are presented in Table 1.  The success rate is similar to a measure 
used by Bond and Fleisher (1990; 1994; also see Ragsdale 1998: 390-91).  The data cover the 
years 1949-2000 or the 81st through the 106th Congresses26.   
-Table 4.1 about here – 
Model 1 examines the bivariate relationship between the divided party control dummy 
variable and presidential success.  The results confirm conventional wisdom (and H1a), as 
divided party control significantly decreases the president’s success rate in Congress.  Model 2 
examines whether the effects of divided party control on presidential success rates have been 
constant over time.  To test the hypothesis that the effects of divided party control changed over 
time (H2), Model 2 breaks the divided party control dummy variable into two periods, from 
1949-1980 and 1981-2000 onward (the period in which the greatest level of ideological 
polarization emerges).  The results show that divided government exerts a significant effect on 
presidential success in both periods (although the coefficient is larger – more negative –  in the 
post-1981 era).  This indicates that presidential success is significantly lower during periods of 
divided party control in both the pre-1981 and post-1981 time periods.  This suggests that the 
findings of studies examining presidential success in a smaller time period (such as Bond and 
Fleisher’s work, which ends in 1990) are not time contingent. 
                                                 
26 The data for 1963 reflect the distance scores for John F. Kennedy, as his 
assassination occurred in late November.  Thus, the distance scores for the 88th Congress 
are the average scores for Kennedy in 1963 and Johnson in 1964.  The data for 1974 
reflect the average scores for Nixon and Ford, as Nixon’s resignation occurred in the 
middle of the year.  Thus, the distance scores for the 93rd Congress are the average of 
Nixon’s 1973 scores and the combined Nixon/Ford scores of 1974.   
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Model 3 examines the effect of the Greater Adversity (GA) measures.  As hypothesized 
(H4) ideological adversity is negatively and significantly related to presidential success.  As the 
ideological distance between the president and the committee chairmen increases, his chances 
of success in Congress drop.  On average, a one standard deviation increase in ideological 
adversity would lead to a 4.2% decrease in presidential success in Congress.  Surprisingly, with 
respect to H3, party seat allocations do not significantly affect success rates in the GA model.  
When the president’s party controls a larger percentage of the seats, his success rate does not 
increase.  There are two possible interpretations of this result.  First, it may be the product of the 
way in which the dependent variable is constructed, as it averages the success rates across the 
House and Senate.  Thus, the president does not need to have to have a large seat majority in 
both chambers for his concurrence rate to increase.  Rather, s/he can have a high success rate in 
one chamber, despite a more adverse situation in the other chamber.  In other words, the 
president can face an increasingly large deficit in one chamber, yet still have a similar success 
rate overall (or perhaps an even higher success rate, given what happens in the other chamber).  
A second explanation is that the a majority may   Additionally, the traditional divided 
government dummy variable is not significant in the Greater Adversity model, indicating that 
party control does not exert an independent influence on presidential success in Congress.  By 
including measures of the other components of divided government, the party control measure 
does not affect the dependent variable.  This suggests that the assumption made by the use of 
the traditional dummy variable, that party control matters, may not be accurate.  In fact, neither 
the dichotomous party control nor the continuous party seats variable significantly affects 
presidential success.  If party exerts any influence on this dependent variable, it does so 
indirectly through ideology. 
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None of the control variables is significant in Model 3.  While the final version of 
Model 3 includes presidential approval, it does not include either budgetary situation or 
bicameral differences.  Again, neither variable is significantly related to this dependent 
variable.  Additionally, given the small number of observations (and thus the limited degrees of 
freedom), these variables were excluded from the final analyses. 
Model 4 examines the effect of the Lesser Resistance (LR) measures.  The results of 
the LR model are similar to those of the GA model, though the Lesser Resistance Ideology 
Measure is significant at the .01 level.  The lower the difference between the ideology of the 
president and members of Congress the greater the potential for success (and vice versa). A one 
standard deviation increase in ideological distance between the president and the average 
committee chairman translates to a 9.44% decrease in success, on average.  As with the GA 
model, seats are not significant in the LR model.  Again, this may be the product of the 
aggregated dependent variable, where the effects of one chamber have the opportunity to be 
minimized by an opposite effect in the other legislative body.  As with the GA model, the 
divided party control dummy variable is not significant after including the ideology and party 
seats measures, again underscoring that the assumptions made by the dummy variable may be 
incorrect.  As with the GA models, neither party variable significantly affects presidential 
success, while the ideology component of divided government is statistically significant. 
Additionally, the LR model explains the highest amount of variation in presidential 
concurrence rates over this time period.  While the adjusted r-squared in the other three models 
ranges from .53 to .61, the LR variables explain approximately 73 percent of the variation in 
aggregate presidential success in Congress.  Thus the chamber that provides the least 
opposition to the president, both ideologically and in terms of seats, is most influential in terms 
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of how much success presidents will have with Congress.  27  This may be because presidents 
turn first to the chamber that offers them the best chance of getting legislation enacted in the 
hope that passing a bill in that chamber will put more pressure on the one that exhibits greater 
adversity.  While this possibility is not tested here, presidents may act strategically by turning 
first to the chamber where they perceive the lesser amount of resistance to their agendas. 
Additionally, the control variable here is significant, as increases in presidential approval are 
associated with a higher probability of presidential success.  As this is the less adverse chamber, 
it is possible that these members are more sensitive to the president’s approval rating.  The 
more adverse chamber may attempt to stymie the president’s agenda, regardless of how 
popular s/he may be.  The lesser resistance chamber, however, may be more likely to support 
the president when his/her approval is high, but may be more reticent to support an unpopular 
president regardless of similar preferences.  As was the case with the previous model, the other 
two control variables (budgetary situation and bicameral differences) were not significant and 
were subsequently excluded from the final models. 
 
Re-Examining Mayhew: Enacting New Laws 
One of the seminal studies of divided government is David Mayhew’s analysis of 
major sources of legislation from 1949-1990 (the 80th – 101st Congresses). Interestingly, he 
                                                 
27 When the dependent variable is separated between chambers, the Greater 
Adversity model better fits the data in the House of Representatives, though the overall 
results are similar to those presented here with respect to the averaged dependent 
variable.  The Lesser Resistance model better fits the Senate data.  These findings should 
not be surprising, as the House of Representatives is typically the chamber that poses the 
Greater Adversity, while the Senate is typically the chamber that presents the lesser 
resistance to the president, both ideologically and in terms of seat allocations.  This is 
especially true of the 1981-1986 period, when the president’s party controlled the Senate 
but not the House of Representatives. 
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found no differences in the number of major laws enacted by the Congress during periods of 
divided or unified party control (referred to as “divided government” in his book).  One 
conclusion derived from Mayhew’s study is that divided party control is not as great an 
impediment to presidential leadership of Congress as conventional wisdom would suggest.  
Again, Mayhew’s use of party control to define divided government still leaves the larger 
question of whether “divided government” is significantly different than “unified government” 
unanswered.  As a result, his findings require re-examination with measures that capture both 
components of  divided government.   
To re-examine this research, I use Mayhew’s extended Sweep One and Sweep 
Two data, including pieces of legislation that were deemed significant at the time of 
enactment as well as those that have been viewed as significant in retrospect.  As with the 
Bond and Fleisher (1990) data, Mayhew has updated his data beyond the years examined in his 
book.28  I re-examine the Mayhew data, including the measures of both the party and ideology 
components of divided government. 
For the models examining the number of major laws passed by Congress, I present 7 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Divided Party Control Dummy – Based on Mayhew’s conclusions, I 
do not expect to find a significant relationship between divided party control and the 
number of major legislative enactments.   
Hypothesis 2: Pre-1981 and Post-1981 Divided Party Control Dummy Variables – 
I hypothesize that the effects of divided party control have not been constant over time.  
                                                 
28 Mayhew has updated his original dataset (1947-1990) to contain every 
Congress through 2002.  These data are available on Mayhew’s Divided We Govern data 
page (http://pantheon.yale.edu/~dmayhew/data3.html). 
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I expect to find that there is no significant relationship between pre-1981 divided party 
control and the dependent variable.  I expect to find a negative relationship between 
post-1981 divided party control and major legislative enactments in Congress.  If 
divided party control only exerts a significant influence on the dependent variable 
during one time period, then the effect of divided party control has not been constant 
over time. 
Hypothesis 3: Greater Adversity Party Seats – Seats adversity will negatively affect 
the number of major laws passed in Congress.  As the president’s party has fewer seats 
in a legislative chamber (in the chamber with the largest seat deficit), the number of 
major laws passed should decrease. 
Hypothesis 4: Greater Adversity Ideology - Ideological adversity will 
negatively affect major legislative enactments.  As the distance between the 
preferences of the president and committee chairmen increases, the fewer major 
laws should be passed by the legislature and signed by the president.   
Hypothesis 5: Lesser Resistance Party Seats – Seats allocations will significantly 
affect Mayhew’s dependent variable, with a higher percentage of seats translating into a 
larger number of major laws passed.  As the president’s party faces a larger seat deficit 
(in the chamber where he has the most seats), fewer major enactments are expected. 
Hypothesis 6: Lesser Resistance Ideology – Ideological adversity will negatively 
affect major legislative enactments.  As the distance between the preferences of 
the president and committee chairmen increases, the fewer major laws should be 
passed by the legislature and signed by the president.   
 90  
Hypothesis 7: Presidential Approval Rating – Presidential approval will not 
significantly affect legislative productivity in Congress.  Higher levels of presidential 
approval will not increase the proclivity of Congress to enact major laws. 
- Table 4.2 about here - 
Table 4.2 presents the results of these models, which employ Mayhew’s legislative 
dependent variable, the amount of major legislation that is passed in Congress.29  Model 1 
confirms Mayhew’s original conclusion.  As is evident in the table, the divided party control 
dummy is not related to the amount of major legislation enacted (which includes both sweeps 
of Mayhew’s measure).  Model 2 again breaks up the divided party control dummy variable 
into the two periods discussed above.  Unlike the findings with regard to presidential success, 
there is a change in the effect of divided party control over time.  Consistent with H2, the pre-
1981 divided party control variable is not significant, while the post-1981 variable is 
statistically significant.  This suggests that Mayhew’s non-finding may be time-dependent, as 
the lack of a relationship in the early period may have hidden the significant relationship that is 
present after the 1980 elections.  Mayhew’s original study only included 9 years after the 1981 
                                                 
      29 Mayhew also controls for a start of term dummy.  Since much of this effect is 
captured by the seats and ideology measures, I do not control for it in the models 
presented here.  All of the models were run with it included, and it was neither significant 
nor did it effect the significance of other variables in the models.  Also, Mayhew includes 
an activist dummy variable.  When included, this variable is significant in all of the 
Mayhew models, but not in the presidential success rate or failed legislation models.  The 
variable is based on the idea that the period from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s was a 
period exemplified by an activist mood.  Yet, the dummy selects on the dependent 
variable by fitting increases in legislation over that period.  As noted by Epstein, 
Kristensen, and O’Halloran (Forthcoming), and discussed in Chapter 3, this variable is 
largely atheoretical and that including it does little to explain variations in this period.  
Indeed it is tautological.  There is increased legislative activity and hence there is an 
activist mood.  Because of this theoretical tautology, and the fact that it is not related to 
outcomes in the other models, I do not control for it here. 
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break.  This also indicates that the second assumption of the divided party control dummy 
variable, that the effects of divided government are constant over time, appears to be flawed.  
Models 3 and 4 introduce the variables that capture both of the components of divided 
government.  Model 3 employs the GA measures, along with the traditional dummy variable 
(which again signifies “party control”).  Ideological distance is not related to the number of 
major laws passed in Congress in either the GA or the LR models.  The seat allocation 
measure, however, is significant in the Greater Adversity Model (yet not in the Lesser 
Resistance Model).  So, while the dichotomous party control variable is not significant, the 
continuous party strength variable (party seats) is significant.  This is an interesting result.  
Given that legislative success (here measured in terms of major laws passed) requires passage 
in both chambers of Congress, this finding should not be overly surprising.  When presidential-
congressional relations are favorable in one chamber, yet not the other, we should not expect 
high numbers of legislative success.  Thus, the Lesser Resistance Model may indicate the 
baseline capacity for passage, but the more adverse chamber still dictates whether a law will 
pass.  Thus, the percentage of seats held by the president’s party in the GA chamber should be a 
better indicator of legislative productivity.  This conclusion is further supported by the higher 
Adjusted-R2 in the Greater Adversity Model (explaining 15% of the variation in the Mayhew 
DV, as opposed to less than 3% of the variation explained in the LR model).  Additionally, 
party control is not significant in either the GA or the LR models, suggesting that party control 
does not independently drive legislative passage.  Again, the significance of party seats in the 
GA model indicates that the party component is still important in determining legislative 
outcomes.  Developing and employing measures of the other components of divided 
government demonstrates that some of these components do in fact have a deleterious impact 
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on the amount of major laws passed by Congress.  This finding, while contrary to those of 
Mayhew, is consistent with some of the more recent studies on divided government (Binder 
1999; Binder 2003; Coleman 1999).  This also underscores the value of the expanded definition 
of divided government that I offer here. 
None of the control variables is significant in any of the models examining Mayhew’s 
dependent variable.  Budgetary situation and bicameral differences were again excluded from 
the final models presented in Table 4.2.  Even though it is not significantly related to legislative 
enactments, presidential approval is included in these models, as it was significantly related to 
presidential concurrence in one of the models.   
 
Failed Initiatives 
Edwards, Barrett and Peake (1997) examined legislation that failed in Congress, rather 
than how many bills passed.30  They hypothesized that the amount of failed legislation should 
be higher in periods of divided government (again defined and operationalized as divided party 
control), a point that they then supported statistically.  This dependent variable is calculated as 
the raw number of failed pieces of legislation31.  As with the previous two dependent variables, 
I re-examine this research by examining the effect of the components of divided government, 
rather than relying on the traditional party control definition and dummy variable used in this 
study.  For these models, I offer the following 7 hypotheses: 
                                                 
30 Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) examine legislative failure in their study, as 
Mayhew’s examination of the number of major laws enacted in Congress is dependent on 
the total number of bills introduced.  Thus, this dependent variable is distinct from 
legislative passage; it is possible to have a high number of major laws that are enacted as 
well as a high number of major legislative failures over the same period, or vice versa. 
31 This variable has a maximum value of 40 failed initiatives (93rd Congress) and 
a minimum value of 9 failed initiatives (83rd Congress). 
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Hypothesis 1: Divided Party Control Dummy – Based on the conclusions of 
Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997), I expect to find a significant relationship between 
divided party control and the amount of failed legislation in Congress.  More pieces of 
legislation should fail during periods of divided party control than during unified party 
control.   
Hypothesis 2: Pre-1981 and Post-1981 Divided Party Control Dummy Variables – 
I hypothesize that the effects of divided party control have not been constant over time.  
I expect to find that there is no significant relationship between pre-1981 divided party 
control and the dependent variable.  I expect to find a positive relationship between 
post-1981 divided party control and major legislative failures in Congress.  If divided 
party control only exerts a significant influence on the dependent variable during one 
time period, then the effect of divided party control has not been constant over time. 
Hypothesis 3: Greater Adversity Party Seats – Seats adversity will be positively 
related to the number of failed pieces of legislation in Congress.  As the president’s 
party has more seats in a legislative chamber (in the chamber with the largest seat 
deficit), the number of failed laws should decrease. 
Hypothesis 4: Greater Adversity Ideology - Ideological adversity will 
positively affect legislative failure.  As the distance between the preferences of 
the president and committee chairmen increases, more legislation should fail to 
pass. 
Hypothesis 5: Lesser Resistance Party Seats – Seats allocations will significantly 
affect the dependent variable, with a higher percentage of seats translating into a fewer 
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pieces of failed legislation.  As the president’s party faces a larger seat deficit (in the 
chamber where he has the most seats), more failed policies are expected. 
Hypothesis 6: Lesser Resistance Ideology – Ideological adversity will positively 
affect legislative failure.  As the distance between the preferences of the president 
and committee chairmen increases, more legislation should fail to pass.   
Hypothesis 7: Presidential Approval Rating – Presidential approval will not 
significantly affect legislative failure in Congress.  Higher (lower) levels of presidential 
approval will not decrease (increase) the amount of failed legislation in Congress. 
- Table 4.3 about here – 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the models examining this dependent variable.   
Consistent with their results, Model 1 confirms that there is a significant bivariate 
relationship between the divided party control dummy variable and the amount of 
legislation that fails in Congress.  Model 2 examines the effects of divided party control in 
the period until 1980 and the period from 1981 onward.  While the pre-1981 dummy 
variable is not statistically significant, the post-1981 variable is positively related to 
legislative failure (significant at the .05 level).  Thus, in the post-1981 period, divided 
party control was more likely to produce legislative failures.  This is consistent with H2, 
indicating that the effects of divided party control are not constant over the two time 
periods.  
In Models 3 and 4, the divided party control dummy variable is again replaced with 
variables the capture the components of divided party control.  The Greater Adversity Model 
(Model 3) suggests that more legislation fails when the president and committee chairmen are 
ideologically divergent, which is consistent with H4.  As the distance increases between the 
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president and Congress, legislative failure is significantly higher.  However, the GA party seats 
variable is not significantly related to legislative failure.  It is possible that the lack of statistical 
significance here is also affected by committee chairmen, or even by use of the filibuster.  The 
vast majority of legislation fails in committee, and these committee effects may operate 
independently of seat allocations.  It is also possible for legislation to be killed via a Senate 
filibuster, a tactic that gives substantial power to members of the minority party.  Thus, the 
president’s party may have more seats in a legislative chamber, yet legislation can still fail.  
Party control again has no effect on legislative failure, once the other components of divided 
party control are included in the model. 
Models 4 presents similar results to Model 3, though party seat allocations are 
statistically significant in the LR model.  While the dichotomous party control variable is not 
statistically significant, again the party component of divided government is related to 
legislative failure in terms of party seats.  The ideological distance variable is again significant, 
and in the expected direction (H6).  The LR Seats measure is significantly (and positively) 
related to the dependent variable, suggesting that a larger seat majority (or smaller seat deficit) 
should translate into fewer failed pieces of legislation.  The presidential approval variable is 
negative and significant in both Models 3 and 4, suggesting that lower levels of presidential 
approval will increase the proclivity of legislative failure.  Again, neither budgetary situation 
nor bicameral differences is significantly related to failed legislation, and both were excluded 
from the final models presented in Table 4.3. 
 The results of the failed legislation models reinforce the importance of examining 
the components of divided government.  Much like the findings of Mayhew, the 
Edwards, Barrett, and Peake results appear to be time-dependent.  While the overall 
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effect of the divided party control dummy variable (Model 1) confirms their findings, 
Models 2-4 suggest that the effects of divided government on legislative failure is more 
complex than their results suggest.  Both the party and ideology components exert and 
influence on legislative failure, though it is party strength (seats) that matters rather than 
party control.     
 
Conclusions 
The analyses presented here suggest that the previous studies of divided 
government have theoretical and methodological limitations.  The results suggest that the 
assumptions of the traditional divided government dummy variable are not supported.  
First, the models indicate that party control is not driving legislative outcomes, as 
previous scholarship has contended.  Instead, once party seat allocations and the 
ideological distance between the president and the legislature are included in the models, 
party control does not independently affect the dependent variables examined here.  The 
second assumption, that the effects of divided government have been constant over time, 
also appears to be incorrect.  Divided government, and the components of the 
phenomenon, appears to have a more deleterious impact on legislative outcomes in recent 
years than it did at the beginning of the post-World War II period.  As party seat 
allocations and the ideological distance between the president and Congress has varied 
greatly over this time period, the overall phenomenon of divided government has been 
more complex than the traditional definition and measure have suggested. 
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 97  
TABLES: CHAPTER 4 
 
TABLE 4.1: OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL CONCURRENCE RATES 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Divided Party 
Control 
Dummy 
Pre-1981 & 
Post-1981 
Dummies 
Greater 
Adversity 
Lesser 
Resistance
Divided Party Control -.209 
(.041)*** 
---------- -.057 
(.108) 
-.053 
(.097) 
     
Pre-1981 Divided 
Government 
---------- -.162 
(.045)*** 
---------- ---------- 
     
Post-1981 Divided 
Government 
---------- -.257 
(.045)*** 
---------- ---------- 
     
Greater Adversity 
Party Seats 
---------- ---------- -.212  
(.207) 
---------- 
     
Greater Adversity 
Ideology 
---------- ---------- -.157 
(.084)* 
---------- 
     
Lesser Resistance 
Party Seats 
---------- ---------- ---------- -.055 
(.148) 
     
Lesser Resistance 
Ideology 
---------- ---------- ---------- -.353 
(.098)*** 
     
Presidential Approval ---------- ---------- .002 
(.002) 
.003 
(.001)** 
     
Constant .823 
(.033)*** 
.823 
(.031)*** 
.66 
(.108) 
.68 
(.097)*** 
     
N 22 22 22 22 
Adjusted R2 .5385 .6026 .6072 .7340 
Dependent Variable: presidential concurrence rate in Congress 
OLS Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 
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TABLE 4.2: OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MAJOR LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Divided Party 
Control 
Dummy 
Pre-1981 & 
Post-1981 
Dummies 
Greater 
Adversity 
Lesser 
Resistance
Divided Party Control -.967 
(.915) 
---------- 3.13 
(2.25) 
-2.08 
(2.10) 
     
Pre-1981 Divided 
Government 
---------- .033 
(1.08) 
---------- ---------- 
     
Post-1981 Divided 
Government 
---------- -1.74 
(1.01)* 
---------- ---------- 
     
Greater Adversity 
Party Seats 
---------- ---------- -10.06 
(4.96) ** 
---------- 
     
Greater Adversity 
Ideology 
---------- ---------- -1.91 
(1.98) 
---------- 
     
Lesser Resistance 
Party Seats 
---------- ---------- ---------- -2.14 
(4.60) 
     
Lesser Resistance 
Ideology 
---------- ---------- ---------- 3.86 
(2.93) 
     
Presidential Approval ---------- ---------- -.054 
(.043) 
-.056 
(.046) 
     
Constant 6.3 
(.718)*** 
6.3 
(.696)*** 
8.23 
(2.61)*** 
8.72 
(2.99)*** 
     
N 26 26 23 23 
Adjusted R2 .0046 .0657 .1504 .0252 
Dependent Variable: Number of major legislative enactments in Congress (Mayhew) 
OLS Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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TABLE 4.3: OLS REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE FAILURE IN CONGRESS 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Divided Party 
Control 
Dummy 
Pre-1981 & 
Post-1981 
Dummies 
Greater 
Adversity 
Lesser 
Resistance
Divided Party Control 6.39 
(3.76)* 
---------- 4.68 
(7.50) 
7.29 
(6.54) 
     
Pre-1981 Divided 
Government 
---------- 3.70 
(4.21) 
---------- ---------- 
     
Post-1981 Divided 
Government 
---------- 10.16 
(4.66)** 
---------- ---------- 
     
Greater Adversity 
Party Seats 
---------- ---------- 18.39 
(16.86) 
---------- 
     
Greater Adversity 
Ideology 
---------- ---------- 14.77 
(7.02)** 
---------- 
     
Lesser Resistance 
Party Seats 
---------- ---------- ---------- 25.28 
(14.47)* 
     
Lesser Resistance 
Ideology 
---------- ---------- ---------- 19.66 
(10.97)* 
     
Presidential Approval ---------- ---------- -.434 
(.142)*** 
-.434 
(.144)*** 
     
Constant 18.44 
(2.84)*** 
18.44 
(2.79)*** 
39.64 
(8.75)*** 
33.70 
(9.80)*** 
     
N 21 21 19 19 
Adjusted R2 .0864 .1206 .4260 .4096 
Dependent Variable: number of failed pieces of legislation in Congress (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake) 
OLS Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Effects of Adversity:   
Presidential Success on Individual-Level Roll-Call Voting (1989-2002) 
 
Key questions: 
• What effect do the components of divided government have on individual-level 
legislative outcomes?  Are these effects consistent with the conclusions of the 
aggregate-level models? 
• Do the results of individual-level models support the assumptions made by the 
traditional dummy variable used in most divided government studies? 
 
In Chapter 4, I examined the effects of adversity on three dependent variables 
(presidential success in Congress, the number of major legislative enactments, and the 
amount of failed legislation) in aggregate models.  The results suggest that divided 
government is more complex than has been previously discussed.  There are several 
components of divided government, and not all of these components are significantly 
related to legislative outcomes.  Furthermore, while the majority of studies in the 
literature define divided government in terms of divided party control, it does not appear 
to be significant once the other components are included.  Instead, it is the strength of the 
party majority and the ideological distance between the president and Congress that drive 
legislative outcomes in the aggregate models. 
The models examined in the previous chapter do have several limitations, each of 
which will be addressed in this chapter.  All of the dependent variables studied in Chapter 
4 have been tracked in the post-World War II period, with the two-year Congress as the 
unit of analysis.  As the models replicated previous studies of divided government using 
those data, the analyses had a small number of observations.  Additionally, given the 
aggregate nature of the dependent variables used in Chapter 4, I employed the adversity 
measures that are comprised of only one legislative chamber or the other, by way of the 
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Greater Adversity and Lesser Resistance Models.  Similarly, much of the variation in 
these variables is reduced by aggregation to the two-year Congress.  Lastly, the aggregate 
models do not allow for measures to vary based on the content of specific bills.   
Similar to the aggregate-level models of presidential concurrence rates in 
Congress, this chapter examines congressional voting with the president at the level of 
the individual roll-call vote.  Other research has shown that there can be markedly 
different results in aggregate and individual-level models that parallel each other 
(Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).  To demonstrate that the results presented in the 
previous chapter are not the product of these limitations, I examine individual-level data 
in models that do not suffer from these afflictions.   
 
Individual-Level Models of Presidential Success 
The current analysis examines every vote in the House or the Senate on which the 
president stated a position from 1989 to 2002, a total of 2177 votes.  This dataset was 
created by expanding the Bond and Fleisher individual-level data (1990) through 2002.  
To do so, I examined the Congressional Quarterly Almanacs for 1997-2002, which track 
whether the president has a stated position on each roll-call vote (Austin 2003).  Once 
identifying the relevant presidential position votes, I collected data on the vote outcomes, 
vote date, presidential approval rating, and referring committee(s). 
This time period includes periods of unified and divided government under both a 
Democratic and Republican president: unified government with a Democratic president 
from 1993-1994, divided government with a Democratic president from 1995-2000, 
unified government with a Republican president from January to June of 2001, and 
 102  
divided government under a Republican president from 1989-1992 and from June, 2001 
to 2002. 
The dependent variable here is whether the president “won” on a particular roll-
call vote.  In other words, this variable is coded as a “0” when the president opposed a 
bill that was passed in that specific chamber, and when the president favored a bill that 
was defeated in that chamber.  The variable is coded as a “1” when the president 
supported a bill that passed, and when he opposed a bill that was defeated in a vote.  As 
this is a dichotomous dependent variable, I employ a logit model to determine which 
variables affect the probability of a presidential victory on a specific roll-call vote.   
The independent variables used in this model are the same as those used in the 
previous chapter, though the operationalization of these variables has changed as a result 
of the individual-level unit of analysis.  The previous chapter examined dependent 
variables that spanned both legislative chambers, and as a result employed the Greater 
Adversity and Lesser Resistance measures.  As this chapter analyzes the outcome of each 
individual vote, the GA and LR models are not necessary.  To examine the effect of the 
components of divided government on presidential success in this manner requires a 
slightly different measure than those used in Chapter 4.  The measures used here are 
specific for each particular vote. 
The model presented here examines the effect of the components of divided 
government on individual-level presidential success.  Measuring party control is 
straightforward, though here it captures whether the president’s party controls the 
chamber in which the specific vote is held.  For example, when the president’s party 
controls the House of Representatives (but not the Senate) in 2002, a vote in the House 
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would be coded as a “1” for party control, while a vote in the Senate would be coded as a 
“0.”  The party seat allocation variable here, “seats adversity,” measures the difference 
between the percentage of seats held by the president’s party and the opposition party in 
that specific chamber.  Positive values of this variable present a more favorable situation 
for the president, as he holds a seat majority in that chamber.  Conversely, negative 
values translate into a seat deficit for the president in that chamber.  The “ideological 
adversity” measure again captures the distance between the president and the committee 
chairmen.  However, examining presidential success at the level of the individual roll-call 
vote allows for a more precise measure of the preferences of committee chairmen.  For 
each vote, I determined to which committee each roll-call vote was referred32.  I then 
calculated the ideological distance between the president and the chairman of the 
committee to which the bill was referred.33  Operationalizing the components of divided 
government in this manner allows for a much more precise examination of these 
relationships.   
 As with the Chapter 4 models, I control for the president’s approval rating and 
budgetary situation.  The presidential approval measure used in the previous models was 
the average approval rating in the Gallup Poll over a two-year period.  This certainly 
strips much of the variation from the original approval data.  The current analysis 
includes the approval rating of the president at the time of the roll-call vote34. 
                                                 
32 The Library of Congress’s THOMAS website contains committee referral 
information for every bill introduced since 1989 (http://thomas.loc.gov). 
33 For bills that were referred to multiple committees, I calculate the average score 
for the chairmen of these committees. 
34 It is not appropriate to control for bicameral differences in a model that 
examines outcomes that are specific to only one legislative chamber.  Binder’s measure 
was developed for her study of gridlock, which examines the lack of productivity in 
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 For this individual-level model, I present 5 hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Party Control – I expect party control to be significantly related to 
presidential success in the bivariate model.  When the other components of divided 
government are included, I expect party control to no longer affect success (based on 
the findings from Chapter 4). 
Hypothesis 2: Party Seats Adversity – Seat allocations will be significantly related to 
presidential success.  As this variable represents the gap between the percentage of 
seats held by the president’s party and the percentage held by the opposition party, the 
relationship is expected to be negative.  When the opposition party holds a larger 
percentage of seats than the president’s party, the president’s success rate should 
decrease. 
Hypothesis 3: Ideological Adversity – I expect the ideological distance between the 
president and relevant committee chairmen to be significantly and negatively related to 
presidential success.  As the distance between these actors increases, the probability of 
a presidential victory on a roll-call vote should decrease. 
Hypothesis 4: Presidential Approval Rating – I expect presidential success to be 
significantly related to presidential success, in the positive direction.  President’s with a 
higher approval rating should have more success in Congress, even if this effect is 
smaller (and only “at the margins”). 
Hypothesis 5: Budgetary Situation – I expect the national budgetary situation to be 
significantly related to presidential success, in the positive direction.  As hypothesized 
                                                                                                                                                 
Congress as a whole (again, a dependent variable that spans both chambers).  As the 
models presented in this chapter examine votes either in the House or the Senate, no such 
control is necessary. 
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by Mayhew (1991) and Binder (2003), president’s should have more success in 
Congress when the economy is doing well. 
-Table 5.1 about here – 
Table 5.1 presents the Logit analysis, examining determinants of presidential 
success on individual-level roll-call votes.  In Model 1, party control is significantly 
related to presidential success, and in the expected direction (H1).  The probability of a 
presidential victory on a vote is increased when his/her party also controls the legislative 
chamber.  Presidential approval is also positively related to the dependent variable, as 
higher approval ratings translate into a higher probability of a presidential victory 
(consistent with H4).  In Model 1, budgetary situation is not statistically signifncant.   
Models 2 and 3 substitute the other components of divided government for party 
control of the legislative chamber.  As expected (H2 and H3), both the strength of the 
president’s partisan majority (seats) and ideological adversity measures are significantly 
related to presidential success, and in the negative direction.  As the president’s party 
faces a larger seats deficit in a chamber, his probability of success decreases.  Similarly, 
as the ideological distance between the president and the relevant committee chairmen 
increases, the likelihood of a presidential victory in Congress decreases. 
Model 4 presents the full model, with each of the components of divided 
government included, along with the president’s approval rating.  Once party seat 
allocations and ideological distance are included in the model, party control is no longer 
statistically significant (consistent with H1).  Party seats and ideology remain 
significantly related to the dependent variable, and in the expected direction (H2 and 
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H3)35.  These findings are consistent not only with the hypotheses, but also with the 
results of the aggregate-level models presented in Chapter 4.  These findings underscore 
that both party and ideology affect legislative outcomes at the individual level, though the 
influence of the party component manifests itself through the size of the partisan majority 
rather than through simple control of the chamber (as has previously been argued in the 
literature). 
The two control variables, presidential approval at the time of the vote and the 
national budgetary situation, are significant at the .01 level in both Models 3 and 4.  
While presidential approval has a positive effect on roll-call success for the president 
(consistent with H4), the national budgetary situation negatively related to presidential 
success (contrary to H5).  This is a counter-intuitive finding, as it suggests that the 
president should have more success in Congress when the national budgetary situation is 
poor.  
Because the magnitude of the effects are difficult to compare using logit 
coefficients, I now present predicted probabilities, generated using CLARIFY36.  Table 
5.2 presents the effect of a change in each of the components of divided government, 
while holding the values of the other values constant.   
-Table 5.2 about here – 
                                                 
35 Party control is highly correlated with ideological adversity.  Thus, it is possible 
that party control is also significantly related to presidential success rate.  However, the 
potential multicollinearity does not question the significant effect of ideology and seat 
allocations on presidential success rate, as any multicollinearity would only inflate the 
standard errors of these variables and decrease their significance levels.  Given their 
significance in the face of potential multicollinearity, these may be conservative estimates 
of the effects of these other components of divided government. 
36 CLARIFY was developed by Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, 
and is available on King’s webpage (http://gking.harvard.edu/stats.shtml).  This program 
generates predicted probabilities of Y, given specifications of X(s) inputted by the user. 
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With the other variables at their mean, a change from unified party control to divided 
party control translates into an 8 percent decrease in predicted presidential success (61 
percent under unified party control versus 51 percent under divided party control).  A one 
standard deviation increase in the seats adversity measure would yield a 16 percent 
decrease in the predicted probability of a presidential victory on a vote.  This change is 
significant at the .01 level.  Lastly, a one standard deviation increase in the ideological 
distance between the president and relevant committee chairman would lead to a 23 
percent decrease in the predicted probability of presidential success, holding the values of 
the other variables constant.  
While these predicted probabilities provide a more meaningful interpretation of 
the logit coefficients, it is hard to visualize what a “one standard deviation change” would 
mean in terms of “real world” scenarios.  The following section presents more tangible 
examples that illustrate the effect of the components of divided government. 
 
Recent Examples 
In June of 2000, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont switched his partisan 
affiliation from Republican to Independent, shifting the balance of power from a slim 
Republican majority (50-50, with Vice President Cheney serving as the tie-breaker) to a 
slim Democratic majority (50-49, with Jeffords caucusing with the Democrats).  
Following the Jeffords defection, conservative pundits asserted that it was likely that the 
liberals in control would stymie President Bush’s agenda, causing a high likelihood of 
policy gridlock.  While this view may have been valid, what remained unclear is what 
aspect of the new Democratic majority would have this effect.  One possibility is that 
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having a simple majority of seats would have allowed Tom Daschle and his colleagues to 
enact favorable policies and suppress the president’s agenda when bills came up for a 
vote.  The Republican minority, however, still had the ability to filibuster, barring an 
unlikely cloture vote involving 10 Republicans.  A second possibility is that the shift in 
partisan control of the committee leadership might have affected policy outcomes.  In 
other words, the power of the committee chairmen to serve as gatekeepers may have been 
driving gridlock, by killing legislation without ever allowing it to come up for a vote.  A 
third possibility is that some combination of these factors would drive gridlock, as 
Democratic committee chairmen could kill unfavorable legislation in committee, while 
the Democratic majority would have the votes on any bills that were referred back to the 
floor.  Based on the analyses presented thus far, it seems likely that party control itself 
did not affect legislative outcomes in the wake of the Jeffords defection.  Rather, the shift 
in the committee chairmanships and the slight shift in party seat allocations may have 
been more important.   
Other recent scenarios have been centered on committee chairmen, and how they 
may affect outcomes in Congress.  When the Republican leadership determined which 
senators would become chairmen of which committees following the 2002 midterm 
elections, several of their choices were quite conservative.  One of the most glaring 
examples was the selection of Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma to serve as chairman of the 
Environment and Public Works committee.  In roll-call votes in the 107th Congress, 
Inhofe had a zero percent rating from the League of Conservation Voters, an interest 
group that rates members of Congress on their degree of environmentally-friendly voting 
(League of Conservation Voters 2006).  Nevertheless, Inhofe was made the chairman.  
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Would we expect Inhofe to behave differently than a more moderate alternative?  Should 
the probability of an environmental bill that was referred to committee in the Senate be 
markedly different than if, for example, Lincoln Chafee had been the committee 
chairman? 
More recently, Arlen Specter’s rise to become chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in the 109th Congress was a controversial one.  Specter, one of the more 
moderate Republican senators, would be replacing Orin Hatch.  The debate over this 
change revolved around the potential effect of Specter’s ideology on the Republican (and 
Bush administration) agenda.  Specifically, there were concerns over the fate of judicial 
nominees.  Was this debate warranted?  Should we expect a Specter-led committee 
behave differently than one led by Orin Hatch?   
While these are different scenarios, they are all related to the questions addressed 
in this dissertation.  If party control drives outcomes, as the traditional definition of party 
control assumes, then the Inhofe chairmanship (versus a more moderate Republican 
chairman) should have no effect on committee outcomes, as the party control of the 
chamber (and thus, the committee) would be the same under either chairman’s rule.  
Similarly, if party seat allocations matter, we also should not expect a difference between 
these chairmen, as again the seat allocations would be exactly the same in either scenario.  
If, however, the ideology of the chairman matters, either alone or in terms of the distance 
between the committee chairman and other actors in the system, then we should expect a 
significant difference between Inhofe and a moderate alternative.  In the case of the 
Jeffords defection, party control of the chamber shifted from Republican to Democratic 
control, though the seat allocations were nearly identical.  The shift in party control 
 110  
triggered a change in the committee chairs as well, replacing Republican chairmen with 
the ranking Democrat on the committee.  Again, in most cases this translated into a 
significant shift in the ideology of the committee chairmen.  Based on the logit model 
presented earlier in this chapter, what effect should we expect these changes to have on 
presidential success?  
To evaluate these scenarios substantively, I again use CLARIFY to generate 
expected probabilities for the model presented earlier in this chapter.    
-Table 5.3 about here – 
The Jeffords defection changed each of the components of divided government, though 
some of the changes were larger than others.  While party control of the Senate shifted 
from Republican to Democratic hands, there was almost no change in party seat 
allocations.  The Senate went from having 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats to having 
49 Republicans, 50 Democrats, and 1 Independent.  The shift in the ideology of the 
committee chairmen was much more dramatic.  Under Republican control from January 
to June of 2001, the average DW-Nominate score for the committee chairmen was 
.306688, relatively conservative.  Not surprisingly, when the Democrats seized the gavels 
in the committee chambers, the average ideology score of the chairmen became -.37931, 
a relatively liberal score.  As seen in Table 5.3, the Jeffords defection presented a 
markedly different political environment than had existed only weeks prior.  Before 
Jeffords switched his party affiliation, the predicted probability of a Bush victory on a 
roll-call vote was rather high, 77.81 percent.  However, once Jeffords began caucusing 
with the Democrats, the predicted probability of a Bush success dropped to 48.15 percent, 
a 29.66 percent decrease in predicted success.  While this may be partly the product of a 
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shift in party control, the large shift in the ideological distance between the president and 
committee chairman likely played a more critical role.  To isolate the effect of a change 
in committee chairmen, I revisit the other examples discussed earlier.   
-Table 5.4 about here – 
Returning to Inhofe’s chairmanship of the Environment and Public Works 
committee allows us to examine the effect of a change in a committee chairman’s 
ideology on the probability of a presidential victory.  Given that the ideological adversity 
score significantly affects the probability of presidential success (as discussed above), 
what is the relative impact of Inhofe’s chairmanship compared to a more conservative 
alternative?  According to Inhofe’s DW-Nominate score, he was the third most 
conservative member of the 109th Senate.  President Bush’s DW-Nominate score is rather 
conservative as well.  Thus, the distance between the president and Inhofe ideologically 
is relatively small overall.  If, however, John Warner of Virginia (the 2nd ranking 
Republican on the committee) had been named the chairman of the committee, the 
ideological distance between the president and the chairman of this committee would 
have been larger.  As Table 5.4 shows, the difference between Inhofe as chairman as 
opposed to Warner translates into a 3 percent difference in predicted presidential success 
on a roll-call vote, holding all other variables constant (with the president’s party 
controlling the chamber, and holding a 55-44-1 majority in seats).  If a more moderate 
Republican had been chairman (Lincoln Chafee, for example), the change in predicted 
presidential success would further decline.  While the shift from Inhofe to Warner is 
relatively small, the shift from Inhofe to Chafee would drop the probability of a 
presidential victory by another 5 percent (despite the presence of the same majority of 
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seats held by the Republicans).  If only party control mattered, then the ideology of any 
given committee chairman should be irrelevant, once we know the party affiliation of that 
chairman.  In other words, unless ideology mattered, there should not be a major 
difference between two Republican chairmen of the same committee.  The results show 
that the selection of committee chairman is not an insignificant one, and can dramatically 
affect legislative outcomes.  Furthermore, the results suggest that ideology component of 
divided government is an important determinant of presidential success. 
Arlen Specter’s ascension to the chairmanship of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
in 2005 was also meaningful, justifying the fears that his rule would hamper the 
president’s success on issues within the jurisdiction of this committee.  Again holding the 
other variables at their real levels in the 109th Congress (Republican control and a 55-44-
1 majority), the predicted level of presidential success under Specter is significantly 
lower than under the previous chairman of this committee, Utah’s Orin Hatch.  Table 5.4 
shows that a shift from Hatch to Specter as chairman of this committee translates into a 6 
percent decrease in the predicted probability of a Bush victory on a bill referred to the 
Judiciary Committee.   
A final example shows a more stark difference: President Clinton during the 106th 
Congress, a period of divided government in which the Republicans held a 54-46 
majority in the Senate.  Jesse Helms was the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
committee.  The distance between the DW-Nominate score of the president and Senator 
Helms was 1.292 (Clinton = -.492, and Helms = .8).  Consider the difference between 
Jesse Helms as chairman compared to the next Republican chairman of this committee, 
Richard Lugar.  Lugar’s DW-Nominate score is .277, for a distance of .769 from 
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President Clinton.  With Jesse Helms as the chairman, the probability of a Clinton victory 
on a bill referred to the Senate Foreign Relations committee is 43 percent.  If Lugar had 
been the chairman of this committee while Clinton was president, the predicted 
probability of a Clinton victory would have been 59 percent, despite the Republican 
control of the chamber leadership (and majority of votes on the floor).  Thus, a change 
from a more extreme committee chairman to a moderate alternative here would have 
meant a 16 point difference in the predicted probability of a presidential win, even with 
the same party controlling the chamber and the same seat allocations between the parties. 
 These examples underscore the need for the expanded definition of divided 
government, one that allows for both partisan and ideological components.  Rather than 
party control driving presidential success, it is the allocation of seats between the 
president’s party and opposition party as well as the ideological distance between the 
president and key congressmen that matter. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter examined whether the aggregate-level results presented in Chapter 4 
still hold when examining individual-level data.  The analyses presented here compensate 
for the shortcomings of the models presented previously, expanding the number of 
observations to over 1,500, and incorporating variables that are operationalized in an 
issue-specific manner.  Analyzing presidential success on every congressional roll-call 
vote from 1989 to 2002, I find that the party seat allocations and ideological distance 
between the president and relevant committee chairmen are statistically significant, while 
again party control does not appear to exert an independent effect on the dependent 
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variable.  This further questions the traditional definition of divided government, which 
states that “party control matters.” 
Furthermore, the subsequent analyses presented in this chapter demonstrate the 
substantive impact that these components can have on legislative outcomes.  Using recent 
examples, I show that shifts in the components of divided government can have 
meaningful effects on presidential-congressional relations. 
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TABLES: CHAPTER 5 
 
TABLE 5.1: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS ON INDIVIDUAL ROLL-CALL 
VOTES 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Divided Party 
Control 
Dummy 
Adversity 
Measures 
Adversity 
Model with 
Controls 
Full Model 
Party Control 1.96 
(.177)*** 
---------- ---------- .309 
(.463) 
     
Ideological Adversity ---------- -1.68 
(.245)*** 
-1.01 
(.360)*** 
-1.11 
(.390)*** 
     
Seats Adversity ---------- -2.68 
(.652)*** 
-4.72 
(.894)*** 
-5.37 
(.1.32)*** 
     
Presidential Approval .014  
(.005)*** 
---------- .020 
(.006)*** 
.021 
(.006)*** 
     
Budgetary Situation -.005  
(.005) 
---------- -.027 
(.008)*** 
-.030 
(.009)*** 
     
Constant 1.10 
(.281)*** 
.151 
(.172)*** 
.348 
(.327) 
.454 
(.348) 
     
N 1962 1522 1423 1423 
Psuedo R2 .0663 .0892 .0962 .0968 
Dependent Variable: presidential success on individual vote 
Logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses 
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 
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TABLE 5.2: CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES 
 
   Predicted Presidential  
   Success Rate:  
Party Control    
Unified: 61%     
Divided: 53%     
   Change: -8%  
Seats       
Low Adversity: 62%     
High Adversity: 46%     
   Change: -16%***  
Ideological Distance       
Low Adversity: 66%     
High Adversity: 43%     
   Change: -23%***  
      
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 
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TABLE 5.3 – CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES: JEFFORDS DEFECTION 
 
 Recent Example: 107th Congress:  
Before Jeffords Defection    
Party Control Republican 
Seat Allocations 50 Republicans, 50 Democrats 
Ideological Distance  
Between President and Committee Chairmen 0.255312 
  
Predicted Presidential Success Rate 0.7781
  
After Jeffords Defection     
Party Control Democratic 
Seat Allocations 49 Republicans, 50 Democrats 
Ideological Distance  
Between President and Committee Chairmen 0.94131 
  
Predicted Presidential Success Rate 0.4815
  
Overall Change in Predicted Presidential Success: -0.2966
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TABLE 5.4 – CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES: COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN 
 
 Recent Example: 109th Congress:  
 Unified Party Control; 55 Republican seats  
     
   Predicted Presidential 
         Success Rate  
     
Committee  Chairman Pr(Success):  
Envir. & Pub. Works Inhofe (R-OK) 85% 
  Warner (R-VA) 82% 
  Change: -3% 
     
Judiciary Hatch (R-UT) 82% 
  Specter (R-PA) 76% 
  Change: -6% 
 Recent Example: 106th Congress:  
 Divided Party Control; 54 Republican seats  
     
   Predicted Presidential 
         Success Rate  
     
Committee  Chairman Pr(Success):  
Foreign Relations Helms (R-NC) 43% 
  Lugar (R-IN) 59% 
  Change: 16% 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
 Divided government is one of the most widely examined topics in the political 
science literature.  This research has been particularly common over the past two 
decades, as scholars grappled with the political reality that divided party control is a more 
prevalent part of American national government.  Yet, despite the voluminous literature 
examining this phenomenon, there is still considerable disagreement about the effect of 
divided government on various political outcomes.  While some scholars have asserted 
that divided government does not hamper presidential-congressional relations, others 
concluded that periods of divided government seriously affect the political relationship 
between these two constitutional actors.  The present research contends that we have a 
limited understanding of what divided government really means, as well as what aspects 
of divided government actually affect presidential-congressional relations. 
 At first glance, divided government appears to be a relatively easy concept to 
define.  The definition employ to date asserts that this phenomenon is synonymous with 
“divided party control.”  Given this narrow definition, the vast majority of the studies of 
divided government use a dichotomous variable to capture this phenomenon.  This 
dissertation contributes to the literature on divided government by expanding this 
definition to include both the party and ideological components of divided government.  
This broader conceptualization of divided government is a better reflection of just how 
much agreement or disagreement (adversity) exists between the president and Congress.   
By offering a more appropriate definition of divided government, my research 
allows studies to employ measures that capture the theoretically distinct components of 
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divided government to determine just what aspect of the presidential-congressional 
relations affects any particular outcome.  Rather than the traditional dummy variable used 
in past research, scholars can examine party control, party seat allocations, and ideology 
separately.  Using these measures provide the added benefit of allowing researchers to 
avoid making the assumptions inherent to the dummy variable that is used in most 
“divided government” studies.  This research demonstrates that these assumptions, that 
(1) Party control of institutions is all that matters, and (2) the effects of divided 
government have been constant over time, appear flawed when examined empirically.  If 
these assumptions were correct, then the use of a dichotomous variable would be 
appropriate.  However, the analyses presented in the current research demonstrate that 
divided government is a much more complex phenomenon than has been previously 
discussed.  Rather than only being a function of party control, divided government 
actually contains several distinct components.  In addition to the party control that is so 
commonly associated with the phenomenon, divided government is also a function of the 
number of seats held by the president’s party in each legislative chamber, as well as the 
policy preferences of the actors in this relationship.   
 These components of divided government, and their effect on legislative 
outcomes, fit with existing and newly developing theories in the political science 
literature.  Much scholarship has discussed the effect of parties and partisanship on a 
wide range of legislative outcomes.  While the divided government literature speaks 
directly to this broader literature on the effects of parties, by assuming that party control 
is all that matters, these two literatures have remained distinct in the discipline.  The other 
components of divided government also have their place in the broader literature, as 
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much has been written on the effect of seat majorities and ideology on the legislative 
process.  In fact, much of the literature on party effects has been engaged in an ongoing 
debate with participants in the literature asserting that ideology drives outcomes.  The 
current research seeks to reconcile the divided government literature with the broader 
gridlock literature on legislative outcomes by testing empirically the relative effects of 
the components of divided government.  The results here demonstrate that it is seat 
allocations and ideological distance between the president and Congress (here 
operationalized as the committee chairs), rather than party control, which drive a variety 
of legislative outcomes.     
 Additionally, this research demonstrates that the components of divided 
government have varied widely in the post-World War II period.  In the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s, divided government posed a less deleterious political environment than it has 
in recent decades, largely because the elected officials were less polarized.  As discussed 
in Chapter 3, President Eisenhower likely faced a slightly less adverse political 
environment during a period of divided government in the 1950s than did his successor, 
John F. Kennedy, who governed with a Democratic House and Senate.  The conservative 
Southern Democrats were ideologically closer to the Republican Eisenhower than to the 
more liberal Democratic Kennedy.  As the Democratic delegations became more liberal 
in recent decades, and as the Republican delegations became more conservative (through 
electoral and idiosyncratic factors), the ideological component of divided government 
began to play a larger role in derailing presidential-congressional relations.  This 
underscores the conclusion that based on the components of divided government, there 
may be a more adverse relationship between the president and Congress during a period 
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of unified party control than during divided government, a possibility that has been 
ignored in the divided government literature.   
This dissertation suggests that scholars examining the effects of divided 
government should incorporate the expanded definition of divided government offered 
here, as well as the measures of the components of divided government. 
 
Implications 
The conclusions of this research have many implications for the broader political 
science literature.  As discussed above, this research has implications for the debate over 
the antecedents of legislative success and failure.  Given the relative significance of the 
components of divided government, this research finds greater support for those who 
argue that ideology rather than parties drives legislative outcomes (Brady and Volden 
2006; Krehbeil 1998).  While party control may have some effect, it is clear that simply 
controlling the chamber itself does not guarantee legislative victory for the president. 
Even if the same party controls the House or the Senate, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, 
the presence of different committee chairs with different ideologies can greatly impact 
the likelihood of presidential success.  Thus, we need to move beyond a mere focus on 
party control.  The strength of the seats majority (or deficit) and the ideological 
(dis)agreement between the president and key legislators are central to our understanding 
of presidential-congressional relations.   
These findings suggest that the vast majority of studies that define divided 
government only in terms of party control may need to be reexamined, as this political 
phenomenon is much more nuanced than it has appeared previously.  This seemingly 
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simple situation is in fact more complex, as divided government has several components 
that are theoretically distinct.  Given these separate elements, the use of a dummy 
variable is not appropriate for understanding the effect of divided government on any 
dependent variable.  In most studies, divided government is included in the model 
because it is assumed to present a more deleterious political environment for presidential-
congressional relations.  However, use of the dummy variable in these research projects 
capture sonly party control, not whether the relationship is adverse.  Conceptually, many 
of the studies that examine divided government do so because they believe the policy 
preferences of the president and members of Congress will be more divergent during 
divided party control than unified party control.  Theoretically, these scholars want to 
examine a different component of divided government (ideological adversity), yet the use 
of a dummy variable actually examines only party control.  The use of this flawed 
dichotomous measure may mask the true nature of the relationship, explaining why so 
many discrepancies exist in the present literature.  Using the expanded concept of divided 
government and these more nuanced and theoretically appropriate measures, scholars 
may be able to reconcile some of the seemingly contradictory findings that have become 
commonplace in the divided government literature.  This research has addressed this 
void by contributing theoretically and methodologically distinct components of divided 
government.   
 Lastly, this research contributes to the literature examining presidential-
congressional relations in three other ways.  Many scholars have wrestled with the 
problem of how to examine congressional outcomes that involve both the House and the 
Senate.  The creation of the Greater Adversity and Lesser Resistance Models allow 
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scholars to examine dependent variables that span both legislative chambers, without 
having to simply take the average of the House and the Senate.  In addition, the current 
study adds to the divided government literature by incorporating measures that more 
explicitly bring the president back into the model.  While previous work has focuses 
primarily on the congressional side of this relationship, modeling the position of 
congressmen in relation to the president provides a more meaningful measure of their 
relative policy positions.  Finally, it also provides a theoretical rationale for bringing 
committee chairs into the analyses.  This is of particular importance for future research, 
particularly as the unit of analysis moves toward more policy specific areas. 
 
Future Research 
 While the current research has advanced our understanding of divided 
government and tested the effects of the components of divided government on various 
legislative outcomes, this work presents several avenues for future research.  First, the 
models presented in this dissertation can be broken down further to determine whether 
the effects of the components of divided government are constant across legislative 
chambers.  More specifically, the analyses presented in Chapter 5 combine roll-call votes 
in the House and the Senate into a single model.  It is possible to separate these roll-call 
votes into their respective chambers to determine whether each component of divided 
government has the same effect in each chamber.  To do so would allow researchers to 
test whether the power of committee chairmen is significantly different in the House and 
the Senate.  If the committee chairmen in the House of Representatives are more 
powerful than their Senate counterparts, then we should expect the ideological adversity 
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component to have a more significant impact on presidential success rates in the House 
than in the Senate.  Additionally, if the presence of the filibuster in the Senate does 
increase the need for a legislative supermajority, then seat allocations may be more 
important in the Senate than in the House.  The larger membership in the House may also 
affect the importance of seat allocations.  Theses are empirical questions, ones that can 
easily be addressed with the data generated for the current research. 
 A second area to extend the current research is to examine the effects of the 
components of divided government on other dependent variables (including an analysis 
of the possible changing effects of this phenomenon over time).  Chapter Two discussed 
numerous dependent variables that have been studied with respect to divided government 
(e.g., executive orders, vetoes).  Given the prominence of the methodologically and 
theoretically dubious dummy variable by most of these scholars, it would be valuable to 
reexamine previous findings using the components of divided government posited here.  
For example, one could test the effect of the components of divided government on the 
fate of judicial nominations, executive orders, and legislative “gridlock.”   Importantly, 
re-examining studies of judicial nominations and confirmations would allow a researcher 
to employ issue specific measures of ideological adversity by incorporating the 
preferences of the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.  By re-examining 
previous studies of divided government with these new measures, we may be able to 
reconcile the contradictory findings that have prevented the divided government literature 
from reaching a consensus on the effects of this phenomenon.   
 This research may also be extended by examining the effects of the components 
of divided government on other stages in the legislative process.  The vast majority of 
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studies on legislative outcomes examine roll-call votes or legislative productivity/success.  
However, most legislation dies in committee without ever being referred to the chamber 
floor for consideration.  Thus, many studies of legislative success are selecting on the 
dependent variable through their examination of roll-call votes, by considering only the 
most successful bills – those that make it to the floor for a vote.  By considering the 
antecedents of legislative success and failure at the committee stage, we may better 
understand the effect of the components of divided government on the legislative process. 
 These future studies would build on the contributions made by this dissertation, 
further developing our understanding of the complexity of divided government.  By 
incorporating the components (and their respective measures) of divided government into 
the broader literature, we will be able to better understand the effect of this common 
political occurrence on countless American political outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Jeffrey Allen Fine 2006 
 127  
References 
 
Aldrich, John H., and James S. Battista. 2000. Conditional Party Government in the 
States. American Journal of Political Science 46 (1):235-56. 
Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 1998. Theories of Party in the Legislature and the 
Transition to Republican Rule in the House. Political Science Quarterly 112:112-
35. 
Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 2000. The Republican Revolution and the House 
Appropriations Committee. Journal of Politics 62 (1):112-35. 
Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 2001. The Logic of Conditional Party 
Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection. In Congress Reconsidered, 
edited by L. C. Dodd and B. I. Oppenheimer. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Press. 
Alt, James E., and Robert C. Lowry. 1994. Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and 
Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States. American Political Science Review 88 
(4):811-828. 
Austin, Jan, ed. 2003. Congressional Quarterly Almanac Plus; 107th Congress, 2nd 
Edition. 58 vols. Vol. LVIII. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 
Binder, Sarah A. 1999. The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96. American 
Political Science Review 93 (3):519-533. 
Binder, Sarah A. 2003. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
Binder, Sarah A., Eric D. Lawrence, and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. Uncovering the 
Hidden Effect of Party. Journal of Politics 61 (3):815-831. 
Binder, Sarah A., and Forrest Maltzman. 2002. Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal 
Judges, 1947-1998. American Journal of Political Science 46 (1):190-199. 
Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher. 1990. The President in the Legislative Arena. Edited 
by B. I. Page, American Politics and Political Economy Series. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher, eds. 2000. Polarized Politics: Congress and the 
President in a Partisan Era. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley. 1991. The Structure of Presidential Approval: 
Constraints within and across Presidencies. The Journal of Politics 53 (4):993-
1017. 
Brace, Paul, and Barbara Hinckley. 1992. Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the 
Modern Presidents. New York: Basic Books. 
Brady, David, and Craig Volden. 2006. Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from 
Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush. Edited by L. C. Dodd, Transforming American 
Politics. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Brady, David, Craig Volden, and Keith Krehbiel. 1994. Unified Gridlock. Paper read at 
American Institutions and Economic Performance Conference, at Hoover 
Institution. 
Brewer, Mark D., Mack D. Mariani, and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. 2002. Northern 
Democrats and Party Polarization in the U.S. House. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 27 (3):423-44. 
 128  
Burden, Barry C., and David C. Kimball. 1998. A New Approach to the Study of Ticket 
Splitting. American Political Science Review 92 (3):533-544. 
Burden, Barry C., and David C. Kimball. 2002. Why Americans Split Their Tickets: 
Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government. Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press. 
Cameron, Charles M. 2000. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative 
Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Chiou, Fang-Yi, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2003. When Pivotal Politics Meets 
Partisan Politics. American Journal of Political Science 47 (3):503-522. 
Coleman, John J. 1999. Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party 
Responsiveness. American Political Science Review 93 (4):821-835. 
Conley, Richard S. 2003. The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government. College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press. 
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party 
Government in the House. Edited by B. Berry, R. H. Bates, J. S. Coleman and S. 
Popkin, California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Cox, Gary W., and Keith T. Poole. 2002. On Measuring Partisanship in Roll Call Voting: 
The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1999. American Journal of Political 
Science 46 (3):477-489. 
Cutler, Lloyd. 1988. Some Reflections about Divided Government. Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 18 (3):485-92. 
Edwards, George C. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Edwards, George C., III. 1976. Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige 
as a Source of Presidential Power. The American Political Science Review 70 
(1):101-113. 
Edwards, George C., III, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake. 1997. The Legislative 
Impact of Divided Government. American Journal of Political Science 41 
(2):545-563. 
Epstein, David, Ida Pagter Kristensen, and Sharon O'Halloran. Forthcoming. Conditional 
Presidential Leadership: Pivotal Players, Gridlock, and Delegation. In 
Presidential Leadership: The Vortex of Power, edited by B. A. Rockman and R. 
W. Waterman. Los Angeles: Roxbury Press. 
Epstein, David, and Sharon O'Halloran. 1996. Divided Government and the Design of 
Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test. Journal of 
Politics 58:373-397. 
Epstein, David, and Sharon O'Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction-Cost 
Approach to Policymaking under Separate Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. The Macro 
Polity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fiorina, Morris. 1996. Divided Government. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Groseclose, Tim, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an 
Audience. American Journal of Political Science 45 (1):100-119. 
 129  
Hager, Gregory, and Jeffery C. Talbert. 2000. Look for the Party Label: Party Influences 
on Voting in the U.S. House. Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 (1):75-99. 
Howell, William. 2003. Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential 
Action. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Howell, William, Scott Adler, Charles M. Cameron, and Charles Riemann. 2000. Divided 
Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945–94. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 25 (2):285-312. 
Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. Legislatures and 
Statutory Control of Bureaucracy. American Journal of Political Science 45 
(2):330-345. 
Jackson, John E. 1974. Constituencies and Leaders in Congress. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Jones, Bryan D., James L. True, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 1997. Does Incrementalism 
Stem from Political Consensus or from Institutional Gridlock? American Journal 
of Political Science 41 (4):1319-1339. 
Jones, Charles O. 1994. The Presidency in a Separated System. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Jones, David R. 2001. Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock. Political Research 
Quarterly 54 (1):125-141. 
Kelly, Sean. 1993. Divided We Govern?  A Reassessment. Polity 25:475-84. 
Kernell, Samuel. 1986. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Kingdon, John W. 1981. Congressmen's Voting Decisions. 2nd ed. New York: Harper 
and Row. 
Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. Where's the Party? British Journal of Political Science 23 (2):235-
66. 
Krehbiel, Keith. 1995. Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z. American Journal of 
Political Science 39 (4):906-23. 
Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Krehbiel, Keith. 1999. The Party Effect from A to Z and Beyond. Journal of Politics 61 
(3):832-840. 
Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship. American Journal 
of Political Science 44 (2):212-227. 
Krutz, Glen S. 2001a. Hitching a Ride: Onmibus Legislation in the U.S. Congress. Edited 
by S. C. Patterson, Parliaments and Legislatures Series. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press. 
Krutz, Glen S. 2001b. Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in Congress. American 
Journal of Political Science 45 (1):210-223. 
Krutz, Glen S., Richard Fleisher, and Jon R. Bond. 1998. From Abe Fortas to Zoe Baird: 
Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate. American Political 
Science Review 92 (4):871-881. 
League of Conservation Voters. 2003. National Environmental Scorecard 2006 [cited 
2003]. Available from www.lcv.org. 
Light, Paul C. 1999. The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice From Kennedy to 
Clinton. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
 130  
Lublin, David, and D. Stephen Voss. 2003. The Missing Middle: Why Median-Voter 
Theory Can't Save the Democrats from Singing the Boll Weevil Blues. Journal of 
Politics 65 (1):227-237. 
Mayer, Kenneth. 2001. With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential 
Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Mayer, Kenneth R. 1999. Executive Orders and Presidential Power. Journal of Politics 
61 (2):445-466. 
Mayhew, David R. 1991. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and 
Investigations, 1946-1990. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. The Hunt for Party 
Discipline in Congress. American Political Science Review 95 (3):673-687. 
McCarty, Nolan, and Rose Razaghian. 1999. Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to 
Executive Branch Nominations 1885- 1996. American Journal of Political 
Science 43 (4):1122-1143. 
Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., and Dennis M. Simon. 1985. Promise and Performance: A 
Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity. The American Political Science 
Review 79 (2):334-358. 
Poole, Keith T. Voteview [Data sets: Excel, STATA, SPSS, Text, etc.]. 2003 [cited. 
Available from www.voteview.com. 
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History 
of Roll Call Voting. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Ragsdale, Lyn. 1996. Vital Statistics on the Presidency: Washington to Clinton. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly. 
Rivers, Douglas, and Nancy L. Rose. 1985. Passing the President's Program: Public 
Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress. American Journal of Political 
Science 29 (2):183-196. 
Rudalevige, Andrew. 2002. Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership 
and Legislative Policy Formation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Shipan, Charles R., and Megan L. Shannon. 2003. Delaying Justice(s): A Duration 
Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations. American Journal of Political Science 
47 (4):654-668. 
Sinclair, Barbara. 1983. Majority Leadership in the U.S. House. Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Sinclair, Barbara. 1995. Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of 
Representatives in the Postreform Era. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Smith, Stephen S., and Christopher J. Deering. 1984. Committees in Congress. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Snyder, James M., Jr., and Tim Groseclose. 2000. Estimating Party Influence in 
Congressional Roll-Call Voting. American Journal of Political Science 44 
(2):193-211. 
Strattman, Thomas. 2000. Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting 
Positions and Changing Constraints. American Political Science Review 94 
(3):665-676. 
Sundquist, James. 1988. Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition 
Government in the United States. Political Science Quarterly 103 (4):613-35. 
 131  
Talbert, Jeffery C., Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 1995. Nonlegislative 
Hearings and Policy Change in Congress. American Journal of Political Science 
39 (2):383-405. 
Woolley, John T. 1991. Institutions, the Election Cycle, and the Presidential Veto. 
American Journal of Political Science 35 (2):279-304. 
 
 
 132  
Jeffrey A. Fine 
 
Date and Place of Birth: 
August 19th, 1979 in Boston, Massachusetts 
 
Education: 
 B.A. – Political Science from Vanderbilt University (2001) 
 M.A. – Political Science from University of Kentucky (2004) 
 
Professional Positions: 
Teaching Assistant – Department of Political Science at University of Kentucky 
(Aug. 2001- May 2005) 
Visiting Lecturer – Department of Political Science at Clemson University (Aug. 
2005 – May 2006) 
 
Professional Publications: 
“Checking the Federal Courts: The Impact of Congressional Statutes on Judicial 
Behavior.” (with Kirk Randazzo and Richard W. Waterman).  Forthcoming at Journal 
of Politics. 
 
“A New Model of Presidential Leadership: Presidents and the Bureaucracy.” 
Forthcoming in Bert A. Rockman and Richard W. Waterman, Presidential Leadership: 
The Vortex of Power. Los Angeles: Roxbury Press.  (with Richard W. Waterman) 
 
“Politics, Use of Polls in.” 2005. In The Encyclopedia of Social Measurement, ed. Kempf-
Leonard, Kimberly. San Diego, CA: Elsevier Academic Press. (with D. Stephen 
Voss) 
 
 “Polling Companies, History of.” 2005. In The Encyclopedia of Social Measurement, ed. 
Kempf-Leonard, Kimberly. San Diego, CA: Elsevier Academic Press. (with D. 
Stephen Voss) 
 
 
 
Jeffrey Allen Fine 
August 1, 2006 
